arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2011.07290cs.MAcs.AIcs.GTcs.LG

Opponent Learning Awareness and Modelling in Multi-Objective Normal Form Games

Vrije Universiteit Brussel(布鲁塞尔自由大学);Universiteit van Amsterdam(阿姆斯特丹大学);National University of Ireland Galway(爱尔兰国立大学戈尔韦分校);HU Univ. of Appl. Sci. Utrecht(乌得勒支HU应用科学大学)

Roxana Rădulescu, Timothy Verstraeten, Yijie Zhang, Patrick Mannion, Diederik M. Roijers, Ann Nowé

英文摘要:

Many real-world multi-agent interactions consider multiple distinct criteria, i.e. the payoffs are multi-objective in nature. However, the same multi-objective payoff vector may lead to different utilities for each participant. Therefore, it is essential for an agent to learn about the behaviour of other agents in the system. In this work, we present the first study of the effects of such opponent modelling on multi-objective multi-agent interactions with non-linear utilities. Specifically, we consider two-player multi-objective normal form games with non-linear utility functions under the scalarised expected returns optimisation criterion. We contribute novel actor-critic and policy gradient formulations to allow reinforcement learning of mixed strategies in this setting, along with extensions that incorporate opponent policy reconstruction and learning with opponent learning awareness (i.e., learning while considering the impact of one's policy when anticipating the opponent's learning step). Empirical results in five different MONFGs demonstrate that opponent learning awareness and modelling can drastically alter the learning dynamics in this setting. When equilibria are present, opponent modelling can confer significant benefits on agents that implement it. When there are no Nash equilibria, opponent learning awareness and modelling allows agents to still converge to meaningful solutions that approximate equilibria.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑