通过税收减免进行再分配

摘要：

本文研究解决地方公共品供给不公平的政治可行性政策。我特别关注的是美国普遍存在的高财产税、地域收入差距和公共教育不平等等问题。人们早就认识到，在人口流动的情况下，地方行政管理和学校经费会导致地区之间的竞争。通过解释收入和家庭质量的异质性，我能够对这一现象进行新的阐述，并提出新的政策建议。我的特点是在一个动态的一般均衡模型的位置选择和教育投资的竞争性住房市场，异质财富水平和家庭质量，战略区政府的均衡。当所有的房屋都是自住的，我表明，战略地区之间的竞争导致过度征税，试图吸引更富有的居民。对较富裕地区的支出进行限制和/或征税的一类简单政策是帕累托改进，因此在政治上是可行的。这些政策减少了受教育机会的不平等，同时增加了资金不足学校的开支。较富裕地区过度支出所产生的负面外部效应得到缓解，从而推动了收益。我还讨论了住房拥有程度的政策含义。该模型揭示了新的光观察到的模式的房屋所有权，位置选择和收入。最后，我测试的假设和影响经验使用断点回归设计和数据在马萨诸塞州的财产税公投。

英文摘要：

This paper studies politically feasible policy solutions to inequities in local public goods provision. I focus in particular on the entwined issues of high property taxes, geographic income disparities, and inequalities in public education prevalent in the United States. It has long been recognized that with a mobile population, local administration and funding of schools leads to competition between districts. By accounting for heterogeneity in incomes and home qualities, I am able to shed new light on this phenomenon, and make novel policy recommendations. I characterize the equilibrium in a dynamic general equilibrium model of location choice and education investment with a competitive housing market, heterogeneous wealth levels and home qualities, and strategic district governments. When all homes are owner-occupied, I show that competition between strategic districts leads to over-taxation in an attempt to attract wealthier residents. A simple class of policies that cap and/or tax the expenditure of richer districts are Pareto improving, and thus politically feasible. These policies reduce inequality in access to education while increasing expenditure for under-funded schools. Gains are driven by mitigation of the negative externalities generated by excessive spending among wealthier districts. I also discuss the policy implications of the degree of homeownership. The model sheds new light on observed patterns of homeownership, location choice, and income. Finally, I test the assumptions and implications empirically using a regression discontinuity design and data on property tax referenda in Massachusetts.

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