最优反应动态下收敛对策的频度
The Frequency of Convergent Games under Best-Response Dynamics
摘要:
随机生成正规型博弈的支付矩阵,计算了$n$ -玩家、$m$ -策略博弈集合中具有唯一纯策略纳什均衡的博弈的出现频率.这些都是完全可预测的,因为它们必须收敛到纳什均衡。然后,我们考虑更广泛的一类游戏,收敛下的最优反应动态,其中每个球员选择他们的最佳纯策略连续。我们证明了当参与者的数量或策略的数量趋于无穷大时,收敛博弈的频率趋于零。在$2$ -玩家的情况下,我们表明,至少$10$策略的大型游戏,收敛游戏多个纯策略纳什均衡比游戏有一个独特的纳什均衡。我们的新方法使用一个$n$ -partite图来描述游戏。
英文摘要:
Generating payoff matrices of normal-form games at random, we calculate the frequency of games with a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the ensemble of $n$-player, $m$-strategy games. These are perfectly predictable as they must converge to the Nash equilibrium. We then consider a wider class of games that converge under a best-response dynamic, in which each player chooses their optimal pure strategy successively. We show that the frequency of convergent games goes to zero as the number of players or the number of strategies goes to infinity. In the $2$-player case, we show that for large games with at least $10$ strategies, convergent games with multiple pure strategy Nash equilibria are more likely than games with a unique Nash equilibrium. Our novel approach uses an $n$-partite graph to describe games.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。