We propose a decentralized solution for a pursuit-evasion game involving a heterogeneous group of rational (selfish) pursuers and a single evader based on the framework of potential games. In the proposed game, the evader aims to delay (or, if possible, avoid) capture by any of the pursuers whereas each pursuer tries to capture the latter only if this is to his best interest. Our approach resembles in principle the so-called relay pursuit strategy introduced in [1], in which only the pursuer that can capture the evader faster than the others is active. In sharp contrast with the latter approach, the active pursuer herein is not determined by a reactive ad-hoc rule but from the solution of a corresponding potential game. We assume that each pursuer has different capabilities and his decision whether to go after the evader or not is based on the maximization of his individual utility (conditional on the choices and actions of the other pursuers). The pursuers' utilities depend on both the rewards that they will receive by capturing the evader and the time of capture (cost of capturing the evader) so that a pursuer should only seek capture when the incurred cost is relatively small. The determination of the active pursuer-evader assignments (in other words, which pursuers should be active) is done iteratively by having the pursuers exchange information and updating their own actions by executing a learning algorithm for games known as Spatial Adaptive Play (SAP). We illustrate the performance of our algorithm by means of extensive numerical simulations.
Semi-Explicit Solutions to the Prying-Pedestrian Surveillance-Evasion Differential Game and Extensions to Two Pursuers
School of Engineering, Australian National University(澳大利亚国立大学工程学院);Department of Automation and Systems Engineering, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina(圣卡塔琳娜联邦大学自动化与系统工程系);Department of Electrical and Computer Systems Engineering, Monash University(莫纳什大学电气与计算机系统工程系);Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, University of Melbourne(墨尔本大学电气电子工程系)
Value of Multi-pursuer Single-evader Pursuit-evasion Game with Terminal Cost of Evader's Position: Relaxation of Convexity Condition
School of Mathematics and Statistics, Beijing Institute of Technology(北京理工大学数学与统计学院);National Key Lab of Autonomous Intelligent Unmanned Systems(自主智能无人系统全国重点实验室);College of Information Science and Technology, Beijing University of Chemical Technology(北京化工大学信息科学与技术学院);School of Automation, Beijing Institute of Technology(北京理工大学自动化学院);Beijing Institute of Technology Chongqing Innovation Center(北京理工大学重庆创新中心)
Encirclement Guaranteed Finite-Time Capture against Unknown Evader Strategies
Department of Electrical Engineering, IIT Kharagpur(印度理工学院Kharagpur电子工程系);Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Michigan State University(密歇根州立大学电子与计算机工程系)
Cooperative Nonlinear Guidance Strategies for Guaranteed Pursuit-Evasion
Intelligent Systems and Control Lab, Department of Aerospace Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology Bombay(智能系统与控制实验室,航空航天工程系,印度理工学院班加罗尔);GALACxIS Lab, Department of Aerospace Engineering and Engineering Mechanics, University of Cincinnati(GALACxIS实验室,航空航天工程与工程力学系,辛辛那提大学)
Control Strategies for Pursuit-Evasion Under Occlusion Using Visibility and Safety Barrier Functions
University of California San Diego(加利福尼亚大学圣迭戈分校);General Dynamics Mission Systems(通用动力任务系统公司);Honda R&D Co. Ltd.(本田研发有限公司);University of Michigan(密歇根大学)
Cooperative Guidance for Aerial Defense in Multiagent Systems
Control for Intelligent Systems (GALACxIS) Lab, Department of Aerospace Engineering;Engineering Mechanics, University of Cincinnati, OH 45221, USA. (e-mails: , ). S. R. Kumar is with the Intelligent Systems \& Control (ISaC) Lab, Department of Aerospace Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, Mumbai 400076, India. (e-mail: ).