社区网络上人口博弈的模仿动力学
Imitation dynamics in population games on community networks
摘要:
研究了网络上种群博弈的确定性、连续时间模仿动力学的渐近行为。这种学习机制的基本假设--包括复制动力学--是属于单一种群的参与者通过成对的相互作用交换信息,从而了解其他参与者的行为和相应的奖励。使用这些信息,他们可以修改他们当前的行动,模仿他们互动的玩家之一。调节学习过程的互动模式是由社区结构决定的。首先,这样的网络模仿动力学的平衡点集的特点。其次,对于一类势对策和无向连通社区网络,证明了算法的全局渐近收敛性。特别是,我们的研究结果保证收敛到纳什均衡从每个完全支持的初始种群状态的特殊情况下,纳什均衡是孤立的,完全支持。实例和数值模拟提供了验证理论结果和反例的情况下,社区结构的假设没有得到验证进行了讨论。
英文摘要:
We study the asymptotic behavior of deterministic, continuous-time imitation dynamics for population games over networks. The basic assumption of this learning mechanism -- encompassing the replicator dynamics -- is that players belonging to a single population exchange information through pairwise interactions, whereby they get aware of the actions played by the other players and the corresponding rewards. Using this information, they can revise their current action, imitating the one of the players they interact with. The pattern of interactions regulating the learning process is determined by a community structure. First, the set of equilibrium points of such network imitation dynamics is characterized. Second, for the class of potential games and for undirected and connected community networks, global asymptotic convergence is proved. In particular, our results guarantee convergence to a Nash equilibrium from every fully supported initial population state in the special case when the Nash equilibria are isolated and fully supported. Examples and numerical simulations are offered to validate the theoretical results and counterexamples are discussed for scenarios when the assumptions on the community structure are not verified.
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