解决自动驾驶决策中的冲突
Resolving Conflict in Decision-Making for Autonomous Driving
摘要：
最近关于自动驾驶的决策和规划的工作已经利用博弈论方法来建模代理之间的交互。我们表明，这个问题的Stackelberg游戏制定的基础上的方法容易受到一个问题，我们称之为冲突。我们的研究结果表明，当冲突发生时，它会导致次优和潜在的危险行为。作为回应，我们开发了一个理论框架，分析在何种程度上，这些方法受到冲突的影响，并将此框架应用到现有的几种方法建模代理之间的互动。此外，我们提出了增强利他主义，一种新的方法来模拟玩家之间的互动在Stackelberg游戏，并表明它是不太容易发生冲突比以前的技术。最后，我们通过与人类参与者进行实验来研究支撑我们方法的行为假设。结果表明，我们的模型比现有的博弈论模型更好地解释了人类的决策。
英文摘要：
Recent work on decision making and planning for autonomous driving has made use of game theoretic methods to model interaction between agents. We demonstrate that methods based on the Stackelberg game formulation of this problem are susceptible to an issue that we refer to as conflict. Our results show that when conflict occurs, it causes sub-optimal and potentially dangerous behaviour. In response, we develop a theoretical framework for analysing the extent to which such methods are impacted by conflict, and apply this framework to several existing approaches modelling interaction between agents. Moreover, we propose Augmented Altruism, a novel approach to modelling interaction between players in a Stackelberg game, and show that it is less prone to conflict than previous techniques. Finally, we investigate the behavioural assumptions that underpin our approach by performing experiments with human participants. The results show that our model explains human decision-making better than existing game-theoretic models of interactive driving.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
