GPS欺骗攻击下的PMU数据完整性研究：一个稀疏纠错框架
On PMU Data Integrity under GPS Spoofing Attacks: A Sparse Error Correction Framework
摘要：
考虑在GPS欺骗攻击下减轻对相量测量单元（PMU）的数据完整性的影响的问题。我们提出了一个稀疏的错误校正框架来处理PMU测量可能会损坏，由于GPS欺骗攻击。我们利用稀疏性质的GPS欺骗攻击，这是只有一小部分的PMU受到攻击。我们首先提出了攻击识别条件（在网络拓扑，PMU的位置，和欺骗PMU的数量）下，数据操纵的欺骗攻击是可识别的。可识别性条件对PMU的位置如何影响其对GPS欺骗攻击的弹性具有重要意义。为了有效地纠正伪造的PMU数据，我们提出了一种稀疏纠错方法，其中计算任务被分解成更小的区域，以确保可扩展性。我们目前的实验结果与IEEE RTS-96和IEEE 300测试网络的数值模拟证明所提出的方法的有效性。
英文摘要：
Consider the problem of mitigating the impact on data integrity of phasor measurement units (PMUs) given a GPS spoofing attack. We present a sparse error correction framework to treat PMU measurements that are potentially corrupted due to a GPS spoofing attack. We exploit the sparse nature of a GPS spoofing attack, which is that only a small fraction of PMUs are affected by the attack. We first present attack identifiability conditions (in terms of network topology, PMU locations, and the number of spoofed PMUs) under which data manipulation by the spoofing attack is identifiable. The identifiability conditions have important implications on how the locations of PMUs affect their resilience to GPS spoofing attacks. To effectively correct spoofed PMU data, we present a sparse error correction approach wherein computation tasks are decomposed into smaller zones to ensure scalability. We present experimental results obtained from numerical simulations with the IEEE RTS-96 and IEEE 300 test networks to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach.
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