MAGE: 一组 enclave 之间无需可信第三方的相互认证
MAGE: Mutual Attestation for a Group of Enclaves without Trusted Third Parties
AI总结：
MAGE 是一种无需可信第三方的 enclave 相互认证框架，通过仪器化技术使 enclave 能够推导出其他 enclave 的测量值。
摘要：
Intel 软件守护扩展（SGX）本地和远程认证机制使一个 enclave 能够向另一个 enclave 证明其身份（即 enclave 测量，即其初始代码和数据的加密哈希）。为了验证被证明身份的可信性，一个 enclave 通常会事先将它所信任的 enclave 的测量值包含在其初始数据中，假设在运行时没有可信第三方提供此信息。然而，当这些两个 enclave 之间需要相互信任时，同时将对方的测量值分别包含在各自初始数据中是不可行的，因为任何对初始数据的更改都会改变它们的测量值，使之前包含的测量值无效。在本文中，我们提出了 MAGE，一个框架，使一组 enclave 能够在没有可信第三方的情况下相互认证。特别地，我们介绍了一种技术，用于对这些 enclave 进行仪器化，使得每个 enclave 都能通过其自身初始数据中的信息推导出其他 enclave 的测量值。我们还提供了一个基于 Intel SGX SDK 的原型实现，以帮助 enclave 开发人员采用这项技术。
英文摘要：
Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) local and remote attestation mechanisms enable an enclave to attest its identity (i.e., the enclave measurement, which is the cryptographic hash of its initial code and data) to an enclave. To verify that the attested identity is trusted, one enclave usually includes the measurement of the enclave it trusts into its initial data in advance assuming no trusted third parties are available during runtime to provide this piece of information. However, when mutual trust between these two enclaves is required, it is infeasible to simultaneously include into their own initial data the other's measurements respectively as any change to the initial data will change their measurements, making the previously included measurements invalid. In this paper, we propose MAGE, a framework enabling a group of enclaves to mutually attest each other without trusted third parties. Particularly, we introduce a technique to instrument these enclaves so that each of them could derive the others' measurements using information solely from its own initial data. We also provide a prototype implementation based on Intel SGX SDK, to facilitate enclave developers to adopt this technique.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
