It is well known that every stable matching instance $I$ has a rotation poset $R(I)$ that can be computed efficiently and the downsets of $R(I)$ are in one-to-one correspondence with the stable matchings of $I$. Furthermore, for every poset $P$, an instance $I(P)$ can be constructed efficiently so that the rotation poset of $I(P)$ is isomorphic to $P$. In this case, we say that $I(P)$ realizes $P$. Many researchers exploit the rotation poset of an instance to develop fast algorithms or to establish the hardness of stable matching problems.
In order to gain a parameterized understanding of the complexity of sampling stable matchings, Bhatnagar et al. [SODA 2008] introduced stable matching instances whose preference lists are restricted but nevertheless model situations that arise in practice. In this paper, we study four such parameterized restrictions; our goal is to characterize the rotation posets that arise from these models: $k$-bounded, $k$-attribute, $(k_1, k_2)$-list, $k$-range.
We prove that there is a constant $k$ so that every rotation poset is realized by some instance in the first three models for some fixed constant $k$. We describe efficient algorithms for constructing such instances given the Hasse diagram of a poset. As a consequence, the fundamental problem of counting stable matchings remains $\#$BIS-complete even for these restricted instances.
For $k$-range preferences, we show that a poset $P$ is realizable if and only if the Hasse diagram of $P$ has pathwidth bounded by functions of $k$. Using this characterization, we show that the following problems are fixed parameter tractable when parametrized by the range of the instance: exactly counting and uniformly sampling stable matchings, finding median, sex-equal, and balanced stable matchings.
Consider the stable matching problem on two sets. We introduce the concept of a preference cycle and show how its natural presence in stable matchings proves a series of classical results in an elementary way.
A matching $M$ in a graph $G$ is said to be uniquely restricted if there is no other matching in $G$ that matches the same set of vertices as $M$. We describe a polynomial-time algorithm to compute a maximum cardinality uniquely restricted matching in an interval graph, thereby answering a question of Golumbic et al. ("Uniquely restricted matchings", M. C. Golumbic, T. Hirst and M. Lewenstein, Algorithmica, 31:139--154, 2001). Our algorithm actually solves the more general problem of computing a maximum cardinality "strong independent set" in an interval nest digraph, which may be of independe…
A matching in a graph is uniquely restricted if no other matching covers exactly the same set of vertices. This notion was defined by Golumbic, Hirst, and Lewenstein and studied in a number of articles. Our contribution is twofold. We provide approximation algorithms for computing a uniquely restricted matching of maximum size in some bipartite graphs. In particular, we achieve a ratio of $9/5$ for subcubic bipartite graphs, improving over a $2$-approximation algorithm proposed by Mishra. Furthermore, we study the uniquely restricted chromatic index of a graph, defined as the minimum number of…
On anti-Kekulé and $s$-restricted matching preclusion problems
School of Mathematics and Statistics, Lanzhou University（兰州大学数学与统计学院）；School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China（电子科技大学数学科学学院）
When computing stable matchings, it is usually assumed that the preferences of the agents in the matching market are fixed. However, in many realistic scenarios, preferences change over time. Consequently, an initially stable matching may become unstable. Then, a natural goal is to find a matching which is stable with respect to the modified preferences and as close as possible to the initial one. For Stable Marriage/Roommates, this problem was formally defined as Incremental Stable Marriage/Roommates by Bredereck et al. [AAAI '20]. As they showed that Incremental Stable Roommates and Incremen…
An instance $I$ of the Stable Matching Problem (SMP) is given by a bipartite graph with a preference list of neighbors for every vertex. A swap in $I$ is the exchange of two consecutive vertices in a preference list. A swap can be viewed as a smallest perturbation of $I$. Boehmer et al. (2021) designed a polynomial-time algorithm to find the minimum number of swaps required to turn a given maximal matching into a stable matching. We generalize this result to the many-to-many version of SMP. We do so first by introducing a new representation of SMP as an extended bipartite graph and subsequentl…
Stable matching in a community consisting of men and women is a classical combinatorial problem that has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since its introduction in 1962 in a seminal paper by Gale and Shapley, who designed the celebrated ``deferred acceptance'' algorithm for the problem. In the input, each participant ranks participants of the opposite type, so the input consists of a collection of permutations, representing the preference lists. A bipartite matching is unstable if some man-woman pair is blocking: both strictly prefer each other to their partner in th…
We are given a bipartite graph $G = (A \cup B, E)$ where each vertex has a preference list ranking its neighbors: in particular, every $a \in A$ ranks its neighbors in a strict order of preference, whereas the preference lists of $b \in B$ may contain ties. A matching $M$ is popular if there is no matching $M'$ such that the number of vertices that prefer $M'$ to $M$ exceeds the number of vertices that prefer $M$ to~$M'$. We show that the problem of deciding whether $G$ admits a popular matching or not is NP-hard. This is the case even when every $b \in B$ either has a strict preference list o…
Given a set $A$ of $n$ people and a set $B$ of $m \geq n$ items, with each person having a list that ranks his/her preferred items in order of preference, we want to match every person with a unique item. A matching $M$ is called popular if for any other matching $M'$, the number of people who prefer $M$ to $M'$ is not less than the number of those who prefer $M'$ to $M$. For given $n$ and $m$, consider the probability of existence of a popular matching when each person's preference list is independently and uniformly generated at random. Previously, Mahdian showed that when people's preferenc…
We propose a framework for optimal $t$-matchings excluding the prescribed $t$-factors in bipartite graphs. The proposed framework is a generalization of the nonbipartite matching problem and includes several problems, such as the triangle-free $2$-matching, square-free $2$-matching, even factor, and arborescence problems. In this paper, we demonstrate a unified understanding of these problems by commonly extending previous important results. We solve our problem under a reasonable assumption, which is sufficiently broad to include the specific problems listed above. We first present a min-max …
The Student-Project Allocation problem with preferences over Projects (SPA-P) involves sets of students, projects and lecturers, where the students and lecturers each have preferences over the projects. In this context, we typically seek a stable matching of students to projects (and lecturers). However, these stable matchings can have different sizes, and the problem of finding a maximum stable matching (MAX-SPA-P) is NP-hard. There are two known approximation algorithms for MAX-SPA-P, with performance guarantees of 2 and 3/2. In this paper, we describe an Integer Programming (IP) model to en…
In the stable marriage problem, a set of men and a set of women are given, each of whom has a strictly ordered preference list over the acceptable agents in the opposite class. A matching is called stable if it is not blocked by any pair of agents, who mutually prefer each other to their respective partner. Ties in the preferences allow for three different definitions for a stable matching: weak, strong and super-stability. Besides this, acceptable pairs in the instance can be restricted in their ability of blocking a matching or being part of it, which again generates three categories of rest…
We consider three variants of the problem of finding a maximum weight restricted $2$-matching in a subcubic graph $G$. (A $2$-matching is any subset of the edges such that each vertex is incident to at most two of its edges.) Depending on the variant a restricted $2$-matching means a $2$-matching that is either triangle-free or square-free or both triangle- and square-free. While there exist polynomial time algorithms for the first two types of $2$-matchings, they are quite complicated or use advanced methodology. For each of the three problems we present a simple reduction to the computation …
University of Calabria（卡拉布里亚大学）；University of Belgrade（贝尔格莱德大学）
This paper introduces a new (dis)similarity measure for 2D arrays, extending the Average Common Submatrix measure. This is accomplished by: (i) considering the frequency of matching patterns, (ii) restricting the pattern matching to a fixed-size neighborhood, and (iii) computing a distance-based approximate matching. This will achieve better performances with low execution time and larger information retrieval.
