差异合同
Variance Contracts
摘要:
研究了在保证补偿原则和按期望值原则收取保险费的前提下,投保人最大化其期望效用,保险人限制其风险暴露的方差的最优保险合同的设计问题.我们得到的最优政策半解析,这是共同保险以上的免赔额的方差界是有约束力的。该政策自动满足激励相容条件,这对于排除事后道德风险至关重要。我们还发现,免赔额是不存在的,当且仅当合同定价是精算公平的。针对精算公平的情形,我们对投保人的初始财富和方差界对保险需求的影响进行了比较静态分析。我们的研究结果表明,预期的覆盖面总是更大的富裕的被保险人,这意味着基础保险是一个正常的好,这支持某些最近的实证研究结果。此外,随着方差约束的收紧,谨慎的被保险人承担的损失更少,而保险人面临的尾部风险也更少。
英文摘要:
We study the design of an optimal insurance contract in which the insured maximizes her expected utility and the insurer limits the variance of his risk exposure while maintaining the principle of indemnity and charging the premium according to the expected value principle. We derive the optimal policy semi-analytically, which is coinsurance above a deductible when the variance bound is binding. This policy automatically satisfies the incentive-compatible condition, which is crucial to rule out ex post moral hazard. We also find that the deductible is absent if and only if the contract pricing is actuarially fair. Focusing on the actuarially fair case, we carry out comparative statics on the effects of the insured's initial wealth and the variance bound on insurance demand. Our results indicate that the expected coverage is always larger for a wealthier insured, implying that the underlying insurance is a normal good, which supports certain recent empirical findings. Moreover, as the variance constraint tightens, the insured who is prudent cedes less losses, while the insurer is exposed to less tail risk.
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