定价组成员资格
Pricing group membership
摘要：
我们考虑一个模型，代理人在他们的“类型”，这决定了他们对公共品的自愿贡献不同。我们分析了在集中化和集中化选择下，群体的均衡组成是什么。我们证明了存在一个自上而下的排序均衡，即存在一组价格，导致可以按类型级别排序的组的均衡，组中的前k种类型具有最高的价格，依此类推。我们还分析了内生群体规模的模型，并检查在什么条件下是自上而下排序的社会效率。我们举例说明，当集成（即混合类型，使每个组的平均类型，如果相同）是社会上比自上而下排序。最后，我们表明，自上而下排序是有效的，即使在群体之间的竞争。
英文摘要：
We consider a model where agents differ in their `types' which determines their voluntary contribution towards a public good. We analyze what the equilibrium composition of groups are under centralized and centralized choice. We show that there exists a top-down sorting equilibrium i.e. an equilibrium where there exists a set of prices which leads to groups that can be ordered by level of types, with the first k types in the group with the highest price and so on. This exists both under decentralized and centralized choosing. We also analyze the model with endogenous group size and examine under what conditions is top-down sorting socially efficient. We illustrate when integration (i.e. mixing types so that each group's average type if the same) is socially better than top-down sorting. Finally, we show that top down sorting is efficient even when groups compete among themselves.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
