Sybil-Resilient硬币铸造
Sybil-Resilient Coin Minting
摘要：
我们描述了一个分布式的硬币铸造协议，铸造一个硬币每单位时间为每个成员在一个数字社区。该协议假设社区成员使用信任图来确定数字身份的真实性，并且这样做限制了社区中的sybil（假身份或重复身份）的数量，但并没有完全消除它们。该协议的主要目标是对渗透到社区的sybil具有弹性，从长远来看，只有真正的身份才能铸造硬币。该协议接受sybil不时地渗透社区（通过在信任图中获得足够的信任），但假设每个sybil最终都会暴露。由于一个女巫所铸造的硬币在其被曝光时很可能会流通，因此协议将引入女巫的责任推给了它信任的邻居，并将随后由他们铸造的硬币重新分配，直到该女巫所铸造的硬币被计算在内。特别是，该协议为女巫铸造的每一枚硬币提供两枚硬币：一枚用于恢复错误铸造的硬币，另一枚作为最初引入女巫的罚款。我们认为，这种方法构成了一种机制，以阻止引入sybils到社区和激励sybil狩猎（使用没收的钱作为奖励的一部分）。
英文摘要：
We describe a distributed coin minting protocol that mints one coin per time unit for each member in a digital community. The protocol assumes that community members use a trust-graph to determine the genuineness of digital identities, and that doing so bounds the number of sybils (fake or duplicate identities) in the community, but does not completely eliminate them. The main goal of the protocol is to be resilient to the sybils that penetrate the community, in the sense that, in the long run, only genuine identities mint coins. The protocol accepts that sybils penetrate the community from time to time (by gaining enough trust within the trust-graph), yet assumes that every sybil is eventually exposed. Since coins minted by a sybil will most probably circulate by the time it is exposed, the protocol puts the responsibility for introducing a sybil onto its trusting neighbours and confiscates subsequent coins minted by them, until the coins minted by that sybil are accounted for. In particular, the protocol confiscates two coins for each coin minted by the sybil: one to recover what was wrongly minted and one as a fine for introducing the sybil in the first place. We argue that this approach constitutes a mechanism to deter the introduction of sybils into the community and to incentivize sybil hunting (using part of the confiscated money as a reward).
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
