失败的推理

摘要：

安全仪表系统（SIS）保护重大危险设施，如发电厂，防止灾难性事故。SIS由硬件部件和控制器软件--"程序“组成。目前的SIS安全分析包括故障树的构建，总结组件的潜在故障以及它们如何在SIS中出现。识别故障的练习通常依赖于安全工程师的经验。不幸的是，程序部分往往过于复杂，无法以这种“手工”方式进行分析，因此无法准确捕捉它对最终安全分析的影响。在本文中，我们演示了如何故障和故障模式的正式模型可以用来分析SIS程序的影响。我们概述了\emph{Failure Mode Reasoning}的基本概念及其在安全分析中的应用，并通过一个实际例子说明了这些想法。

英文摘要：

Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) protect major hazard facilities, e.g. power plants, against catastrophic accidents. An SIS consists of hardware components and a controller software -- the ``program''. Current safety analyses of SIS' include the construction of a fault tree, summarising potential faults of the components and how they can arise within an SIS. The exercise of identifying faults typically relies on the experience of the safety engineer. Unfortunately the program part is often too complicated to be analysed in such a ``by hand" manner and so the impact it has on the resulting safety analysis is not accurately captured. In this paper we demonstrate how a formal model for faults and failure modes can be used to analyse the impact of an SIS program. We outline the underlying concepts of \emph{Failure Mode Reasoning} and its application in safety analysis, and we illustrate the ideas on a practical example.

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