Only Time Will Tell: 可信的动态信号传递
Only Time Will Tell: Credible Dynamic Signaling
AI总结：
本文针对承诺力消失的动态信号模型，证明无需不合理非均衡信念即可存在信息均衡，精准刻画了以消耗战实现的分离均衡，并通过多领域应用验证了一般性框架的结论。
摘要：
本文刻画了承诺力逐渐消失的动态信号模型中的信息结果。研究表明，与普遍观点相反，具有收益相关性的信号传递的信息均衡，无需依赖不合理的非均衡路径信念即可存在。本文对可能的分离均衡给出了精准刻画：所有信号传递必须通过消耗战实现，此时最弱类型会在披露自身类型与和更强类型混同之间随机选择。本文探索的框架具有一般性，仅对收益单调性和单交叉性施加了最基本假设。文中还将结果应用于讨价还价、垄断价格信号传递和劳动力市场信号传递，以在具体情境中展示研究结论。
英文摘要：
This paper characterizes informational outcomes in a model of dynamic signaling with vanishing commitment power. It shows that contrary to popular belief, informative equilibria with payoff-relevant signaling can exist without requiring unreasonable off-path beliefs. The paper provides a sharp characterization of possible separating equilibria: all signaling must take place through attrition, when the weakest type mixes between revealing own type and pooling with the stronger types. The framework explored in the paper is general, imposing only minimal assumptions on payoff monotonicity and single-crossing. Applications to bargaining, monopoly price signaling, and labor market signaling are developed to demonstrate the results in specific contexts.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
