自由能原理是一种语义学形式理论吗？从变分密度动力学到神经与表型表征
Is the free-energy principle a formal theory of semantics? From variational density dynamics to neural and phenotypic representations
AI总结：
本文评估神经表征在自由能原理和主动推理框架下的解释作用，探讨适配的非实在论哲学立场，提出适应性表型模型可构建形式语义学，修正出以有机体为中心的虚构主义，解释生命系统的意向性与感觉流解析能力。
摘要：
本文的研究目标有两个：（1）评估神经表征这一概念在变分自由能原理及其推论过程理论——主动推理（active inference）——框架下是否具有解释作用；（2）若具有解释作用，评估与表征的本体论和认识论地位相关的哪种哲学立场最为合适。我们重点关注非实在论（紧缩论与虚构主义-工具主义）研究路径。我们考察了一种关于心理表征的紧缩论解释，该解释认为神经表征中具有解释相关性的内容是数学层面的，而非认知层面的；同时考察了虚构主义或工具主义解释，该解释认为表征是具有科学用途的虚构概念，服务于解释（及其他）目标。在回顾自由能原理与主动推理相关内容后，我们提出自由能原理下的适应性表型模型可用于构建一套形式语义学，使我们能够为特定的表型状态（即远离平衡态存在的马尔可夫系统的内部状态）赋予语义内容。我们提出了一种修正的虚构主义解释：以有机体为中心的虚构主义或工具主义。我们认为，在自由能原理下，即便采用神经表征内容的紧缩论解释，也有理由引入认知系统的关指性（aboutness）或意向性所涉及的那类语义内容；因此我们的立场与实在论立场相容，但所基于的假设与实在论不同。我们提出，自由能原理由此解释了生命系统中的关指性或意向性，进而解释了生命系统利用某种本体论或一组语义因子解析其感觉流的能力。
英文摘要：
The aim of this paper is twofold: (1) to assess whether the construct of neural representations plays an explanatory role under the variational free-energy principle and its corollary process theory, active inference; and (2) if so, to assess which philosophical stance - in relation to the ontological and epistemological status of representations - is most appropriate. We focus on non-realist (deflationary and fictionalist-instrumentalist) approaches. We consider a deflationary account of mental representation, according to which the explanatorily relevant contents of neural representations are mathematical, rather than cognitive, and a fictionalist or instrumentalist account, according to which representations are scientifically useful fictions that serve explanatory (and other) aims. After reviewing the free-energy principle and active inference, we argue that the model of adaptive phenotypes under the free-energy principle can be used to furnish a formal semantics, enabling us to assign semantic content to specific phenotypic states (the internal states of a Markovian system that exists far from equilibrium). We propose a modified fictionalist account: an organism-centered fictionalism or instrumentalism. We argue that, under the free-energy principle, pursuing even a deflationary account of the content of neural representations licenses the appeal to the kind of semantic content involved in the aboutness or intentionality of cognitive systems; our position is thus coherent with, but rests on distinct assumptions from, the realist position. We argue that the free-energy principle thereby explains the aboutness or intentionality in living systems and hence their capacity to parse their sensory stream using an ontology or set of semantic factors.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
