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arXiv 2007.08162cs.ITeess.SPmath.IT
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针对无线物理层安全的乘积信道攻击

A Product Channel Attack to Wireless Physical Layer Security

Gonzalo J. Anaya-Lopez, Gerardo Gomez, F. Javier Lopez-Martinez

AI总结:

本研究提出一种针对无线下行链路物理层安全的乘积信道攻击,通过窃听者在上行发送慢变随机符号误导基站高估窃听信道衰落程度,使基站以超保密容量速率传输从而破坏安全,且基站多天线仅能部分缓解该攻击。

摘要:

我们提出了一种新型攻击,可破坏无线系统中下行链路(DL)通信的物理层安全性。该技术的原理是窃听者在其上行链路传输期间发送一个缓慢变化的随机符号,使得基站(BS)观测到的等效衰落信道具有更大的方差。随后,基站会在假设窃听者信道的衰落严重程度高于实际情况的前提下,设计安全的下行链路传输方案。我们证明,这种方法会导致基站以高于保密容量的速率向Bob发送数据,从而破坏系统的安全运行。我们的分析结果得到了仿真验证,结果表明在基站使用多天线可在一定程度上缓解但无法完全免疫此类攻击。

英文摘要:

We propose a novel attack that compromises the physical layer security of downlink (DL) communications in wireless systems. This technique is based on the transmission of a slowly-varying random symbol by the eavesdropper during its uplink transmission, so that the equivalent fading channel observed at the base station (BS) has a larger variance. Then, the BS designs the secure DL transmission under the assumption that the eavesdropper's channel experiences a larger fading severity than in reality. We show that this approach can lead the BS to transmit to Bob at a rate larger than the secrecy capacity, thus compromising the system secure operation. Our analytical results, corroborated by simulations, show that the use of multiple antennas at the BS may partially alleviate but not immunize against these type of attacks.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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