跳至安全：通过有意跳过执行来保障信息物理控制回路的安全
Skip to Secure: Securing Cyber-physical Control Loops with Intentionally Skipped Executions
AI总结：
本文提出一种通过有意跳过控制回路执行的控制理论对策，以抵御隐蔽攻击并降低CAN汽车信息物理系统中的密码安全开销，同时保持性能与安全。
摘要：
我们考虑在存在对设备与控制器之间数据交换的对抗性干预的情况下，可证明地保障给定控制回路实现安全的问题。此类干预可以通过持续运行的监控系统以及密码技术来挫败，但这两种方法都会消耗网络和计算资源。我们提供了一种有原则的方法，用于有意跳过控制回路执行，该方法可作为一种有用的控制理论对策，以应对违反消息完整性和真实性的隐蔽攻击。正如我们的实验所表明的那样，这种控制理论对策有助于降低基于控制器局域网络（CAN）的汽车信息物理系统中密码安全措施的开销以及由此产生的资源消耗，同时不损害性能和安全。
英文摘要：
We consider the problem of provably securing a given control loop implementation in the presence of adversarial interventions on data exchange between plant and controller. Such interventions can be thwarted using continuously operating monitoring systems and also cryptographic techniques, both of which consume network and computational resources. We provide a principled approach for intentional skipping of control loop executions which may qualify as a useful control theoretic countermeasure against stealthy attacks which violate message integrity and authenticity. As is evident from our experiments, such a control theoretic counter-measure helps in lowering the cryptographic security measure overhead and resulting resource consumption in Control Area Network (CAN) based automotive CPS without compromising performance and safety.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
