经济可行的随机性
Economically Viable Randomness
摘要：
我们研究了为区块链应用程序提供\emph{economically viable randomness}（EVR）的问题，即具有重大经济后果的随机性。EVR的应用包括基于区块链的彩票和赌博。EVR源保证（i）保密性，确保随机比特被保密，直到某个预定义的条件指示它们可以安全地公开（例如，彩票销售结束），以及（ii）鲁棒性，保证一旦条件成立就公布随机位。我们将EVR问题形式化，并在类似以太坊的区块链抽象之上解决它，该抽象支持智能合约和可转让的原生币。随机性是通过一个分布式的开放提交-揭示方案由博弈论代理人产生的，他们努力最大化他们的硬币持有量。请注意，在经济环境中，这些代理可能会从打破保密性或鲁棒性中获利，并可能为此参与附带协议（通过智能合约）。我们的解决方案创建了一个对抗此类攻击的激励结构。我们证明，以下协议产生一个稳态，称为联盟证明纳什均衡，从没有联盟组成的一个子集的球员可以同意偏离。在这种稳态下，满足鲁棒性和保密性。最后，我们在以太坊上实现我们的EVR源。
英文摘要：
We study the problem of providing blockchain applications with \emph{economically viable randomness} (EVR), namely, randomness that has significant economic consequences. Applications of EVR include blockchain-based lotteries and gambling. An EVR source guarantees (i) secrecy, assuring that the random bits are kept secret until some predefined condition indicates that they are safe to reveal (e.g., the lottery's ticket sale closes), and (ii) robustness, guaranteeing that the random bits are published once the condition holds. We formalize the EVR problem and solve it on top of an Ethereum-like blockchain abstraction, which supports smart contracts and a transferable native coin. Randomness is generated via a distributed open commit-reveal scheme by game-theoretic agents who strive to maximize their coin holdings. Note that in an economic setting, such agents might profit from breaking secrecy or robustness, and may engage in side agreements (via smart contracts) to this end. Our solution creates an incentive structure that counters such attacks. We prove that following the protocol gives rise to a stable state, called Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium, from which no coalition comprised of a subset of the players can agree to deviate. In this stable state, robustness and secrecy are satisfied. Finally, we implement our EVR source over Ethereum.
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