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arXiv 2006.16345cs.CRcs.AR
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SeMPE:用于去除条件分支侧信道的安全多路径执行架构

SeMPE: Secure Multi Path Execution Architecture for Removing Conditional Branch Side Channels

Andrea Mondelli, Paul Gazzillo, Yan Solihin

摘要:

侧通道漏洞最常见的来源之一是条件分支的秘密依赖行为(SDBCB)。最先进的解决方案依赖于恒定时间表达式,这需要大量的编程工作,并导致高性能开销。在本文中,我们提出了SeMPE,一种方法,依赖于架构的支持,以消除SDBCB,而不需要太多的编程工作,同时产生低性能开销。其关键思想是,当遇到秘密依赖分支时,SeMPE微架构会获取、执行并提交分支的两个路径,从而防止对手从程序的分支行为中推断出秘密值。为了实现这一点,SeMPE依赖于能够安全地顺序执行两个分支路径的架构。通过微基准测试和现实世界的图书馆的评估,我们表明,SeMPE招致接近理想的执行时间开销,这是秘密依赖分支的所有分支路径的执行时间的总和。SeMPE比FaCT(一种恒定时间表达式语言)生成的代码性能高出18倍。

英文摘要:

One of the most prevalent source of side channel vulnerabilities is the secret-dependent behavior of conditional branches (SDBCB). The state-of-the-art solution relies on Constant-Time Expressions, which require high programming effort and incur high performance overheads. In this paper, we propose SeMPE, an approach that relies on architecture support to eliminate SDBCB without requiring much programming effort while incurring low performance overheads. The key idea is that when a secret-dependent branch is encountered, the SeMPE microarchitecture fetches, executes, and commits both paths of the branch, preventing the adversary from inferring secret values from the branching behavior of the program. To enable that, SeMPE relies on an architecture that is capable of safely executing both branch paths sequentially. Through microbenchmarks and an evaluation of a real-world library, we show that SeMPE incurs near ideal execution time overheads, which is the sum of the execution time of all branch paths of secret-dependent branches. SeMPE outperforms code generated by FaCT, a constant-time expression language, by up to a factor of 18x.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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