电力系统电压稳定的Stackelberg安全投资博弈
A Stackelberg Security Investment Game for Voltage Stability of Power Systems
摘要：
我们建立了一个电力系统的攻击者和防御者之间的Stackelberg博弈。攻击者试图秘密地和智能地改变电力系统的负载设定点，使得电网的电压稳定裕度减小，从而将整个系统推向电压崩溃。防御者或系统运营商的目标是通过打开控制设备（如并联电容器组）重新调整无功功率注入电网来补偿这种减少。提出了一种改进的反向归纳法，以寻找一个基于成本的Stackelberg均衡（CBSE），该均衡在预算和隐蔽性约束下，节省了参与者的成本，同时提供了参与者投资资源的最优分配。我们分析了所提出的游戏广泛的IEEE 9总线电力系统模型和IEEE 39总线电力系统模型的性能的一个例子。证明了防御者能够保持系统的稳定性，除非其安全预算远低于攻击者的预算。
英文摘要：
We formulate a Stackelberg game between an attacker and a defender of a power system. The attacker attempts to alter the load setpoints of the power system covertly and intelligently, so that the voltage stability margin of the grid is reduced, driving the entire system towards a voltage collapse. The defender, or the system operator, aims to compensate for this reduction by retuning the reactive power injection to the grid by switching on control devices, such as a bank of shunt capacitors. A modified Backward Induction method is proposed to find a cost-based Stackelberg equilibrium (CBSE) of the game, which saves the players' costs while providing the optimal allocation of both players' investment resources under budget and covertness constraints. We analyze the proposed game extensively for the IEEE 9-bus power system model and present an example of its performance for the IEEE 39-bus power system model. It is demonstrated that the defender is able to maintain system stability unless its security budget is much lower than the attacker's budget.
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