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arXiv 2006.11061econ.TH
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工具博弈论在法律程序中的作用机制--基于随机期权定价的归纳

Mechanism of Instrumental Game Theory in The Legal Process via Stochastic Options Pricing Induction

Kwadwo Osei Bonsu, Shoucan Chen

摘要:

经济理论为理解经济法、侵权法、合同法、程序法等领域中令人困惑的法律意识形态提供了宝贵的直觉。大多数法律制度要求法律纠纷中的当事人通过一种称为“发现”的程序交换信息。其目的是减少各方之间的信息不对称所产生的相对乐观。就像随机过程中的头或尾现象一样,裁决中的不确定性会影响当事人在法律谈判中的决定。因此,本文应用偶然分析的原则,以确定如何谈判失败的法律程序中,引入价值论的最优交易成本的概念,并制定了一个数值方法的基础上向后归纳和随机期权定价经济学估计的合理和公平的交易,以诱导解决,从而提高效率,降低社会成本。

英文摘要:

Economic theory has provided an estimable intuition in understanding the perplexing ideologies in law, in the areas of economic law, tort law, contract law, procedural law and many others. Most legal systems require the parties involved in a legal dispute to exchange information through a process called discovery. The purpose is to reduce the relative optimisms developed by asymmetric information between the parties. Like a head or tail phenomenon in stochastic processes, uncertainty in the adjudication affects the decisions of the parties in a legal negotiation. This paper therefore applies the principles of aleatory analysis to determine how negotiations fail in the legal process, introduce the axiological concept of optimal transaction cost and formulates a numerical methodology based on backwards induction and stochastic options pricing economics in estimating the reasonable and fair bargain in order to induce settlements thereby increasing efficiency and reducing social costs.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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