arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2006.05277cs.NI
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Closed Resolver项目:测量网络流量源地址验证的部署

The Closed Resolver Project: Measuring the Deployment of Source Address Validation of Inbound Traffic

Yevheniya Nosyk, Maciej Korczyński, Qasim Lone, Marcin Skwarek, Baptiste Jonglez, Andrzej Duda

摘要:

源地址验证(SAV)是一种标准,旨在丢弃具有欺骗源IP地址的数据包。传出流量缺乏SAV被认为是分布式拒绝服务(DDoS)攻击的根本原因,并受到广泛关注。虽然不太明显,但缺乏入站过滤使攻击者能够作为网络的内部主机出现,并可能泄露有关网络基础设施的有价值信息。VoIP欺骗可能会放大其他攻击媒介,例如DNS缓存中毒或最近发现的NXNSAttack。在本文中,我们提出了封闭的解析器项目,旨在减轻入站IP欺骗的问题的初步结果。我们进行了第一次互联网范围内的主动测量研究,枚举网络过滤器或不过滤传入的数据包,他们的源地址,为IPv4和IPv6地址空间。为了实现这一目标,我们识别了接受来自其网络外部的欺骗请求的封闭和开放DNS解析器。所提出的方法提供了最完整的图片入站SAV部署的网络提供商。我们的测量覆盖了超过55%的IPv4和27%的IPv6自治系统(AS),并显示其中绝大多数都完全或部分容易受到入站欺骗。通过识别双栈DNS解析器,我们还表明,入站过滤是不经常部署为IPv6比IPv4。总的来说,我们发现了13.9 K IPv6开放解析器,可用于放大DDoS攻击-比以前的工作多13倍。此外,我们还发现了4.25 M IPv4和103 K IPv6易受攻击的封闭解析器,这些解析器只能通过我们的欺骗技术检测到,并且在与NXNSAttack结合使用时会构成重大威胁。

英文摘要:

Source Address Validation (SAV) is a standard aimed at discarding packets with spoofed source IP addresses. The absence of SAV for outgoing traffic has been known as a root cause of Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks and received widespread attention. While less obvious, the absence of inbound filtering enables an attacker to appear as an internal host of a network and may reveal valuable information about the network infrastructure. Inbound IP spoofing may amplify other attack vectors such as DNS cache poisoning or the recently discovered NXNSAttack. In this paper, we present the preliminary results of the Closed Resolver Project that aims at mitigating the problem of inbound IP spoofing. We perform the first Internet-wide active measurement study to enumerate networks that filter or do not filter incoming packets by their source address, for both the IPv4 and IPv6 address spaces. To achieve this, we identify closed and open DNS resolvers that accept spoofed requests coming from the outside of their network. The proposed method provides the most complete picture of inbound SAV deployment by network providers. Our measurements cover over 55 % IPv4 and 27 % IPv6 Autonomous Systems (AS) and reveal that the great majority of them are fully or partially vulnerable to inbound spoofing. By identifying dual-stacked DNS resolvers, we additionally show that inbound filtering is less often deployed for IPv6 than it is for IPv4. Overall, we discover 13.9 K IPv6 open resolvers that can be exploited for amplification DDoS attacks - 13 times more than previous work. Furthermore, we enumerate uncover 4.25 M IPv4 and 103 K IPv6 vulnerable closed resolvers that could only be detected thanks to our spoofing technique, and that pose a significant threat when combined with the NXNSAttack.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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