AI公共资源的悲剧
The Tragedy of the AI Commons
摘要:
近年来,关于人工智能伦理研究的政策和指导方针提案激增。这些应该指导人工智能的社会责任发展,以实现共同利益。然而,通常存在不合作的动机(即,不遵守这些政策和准则);而且,这些建议往往缺乏有效机制来执行其本身的规范要求。刚才描述的情况构成了一种社会困境;也就是说,在这种情况下,没有人有合作的个人动机,尽管相互合作将导致所有参与者的最佳结果。在本文中,我们使用随机进化博弈动力学模型的伦理发展的背景下,人工智能这一社会困境。这种形式主义使我们能够隔离可能被干预的变量,从而为人工智能中众多利益相关者之间的合作提供可行的建议。我们的研究结果表明,如何随机效应可以帮助在这种情况下,使合作可行。他们建议,为共同利益进行的协调应在较小的团体中进行,因为在这些团体中合作成本低,而且失败的风险很高。这为我们提供了深入了解的条件下,我们应该期待这样的道德建议是成功的,就其范围,规模和内容。
英文摘要:
Policy and guideline proposals for ethical artificial-intelligence research have proliferated in recent years. These are supposed to guide the socially-responsible development of AI for the common good. However, there typically exist incentives for non-cooperation (i.e., non-adherence to such policies and guidelines); and, these proposals often lack effective mechanisms to enforce their own normative claims. The situation just described constitutes a social dilemma; namely, a situation where no one has an individual incentive to cooperate, though mutual cooperation would lead to the best outcome for all involved. In this paper, we use stochastic evolutionary game dynamics to model this social dilemma in the context of the ethical development of artificial intelligence. This formalism allows us to isolate variables that may be intervened upon, thus providing actionable suggestions for increased cooperation amongst numerous stakeholders in AI. Our results show how stochastic effects can help make cooperation viable in such a scenario. They suggest that coordination for a common good should be attempted in smaller groups in which the cost for cooperation is low, and the perceived risk of failure is high. This provides insight into the conditions under which we should expect such ethics proposals to be successful with regard to their scope, scale, and content.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。