图形层安全:通过常见的网络物理加密信息
Graph Layer Security: Encrypting Information via Common Networked Physics
摘要:
低成本物联网(IoT)设备的激增导致了无线安全和信道攻击之间的竞争。传统的加密技术需要高计算能力,不适合低功耗的物联网场景。而近年来发展起来的物理层安全技术(PLS)可以利用无线信道状态信息(CSI),其对信道估计的敏感性使其容易受到攻击。在这项工作中,我们利用了物联网收发器之间共享的另一种常见物理:监测到的与信道无关的物理网络动态(例如,水/油/气/电信号流)。利用这一点,我们首次提出,图形层安全(GLS),通过利用网络节点之间的物理动力学的依赖性进行信息加密和解密。利用图傅里叶变换(GFT)算子将这种依赖性刻画到一个图带限制的子空间中,从而通过最大化保密率来生成与信道无关的密钥.我们评估我们的GLS对设计的主动和被动攻击者,使用IEEE 39总线系统。结果表明,GLS是不依赖于无线CSI,并可以打击攻击者有部分网络动态知识(现实的访问完整的动态和关键节点仍然具有挑战性)。我们相信这种新型GLS在安全健康监测和对抗性无线电环境中的数字双胞胎中具有广泛的适用性。
英文摘要:
The proliferation of low-cost Internet of Things (IoT) devices has led to a race between wireless security and channel attacks. Traditional cryptography requires high-computational power and is not suitable for low-power IoT scenarios. Whist, recently developed physical layer security (PLS) can exploit common wireless channel state information (CSI), its sensitivity to channel estimation makes them vulnerable from attacks. In this work, we exploit an alternative common physics shared between IoT transceivers: the monitored channel-irrelevant physical networked dynamics (e.g., water/oil/gas/electrical signal-flows). Leveraging this, we propose for the first time, graph layer security (GLS), by exploiting the dependency in physical dynamics among network nodes for information encryption and decryption. A graph Fourier transform (GFT) operator is used to characterize such dependency into a graph-bandlimted subspace, which allows the generations of channel-irrelevant cipher keys by maximizing the secrecy rate. We evaluate our GLS against designed active and passive attackers, using IEEE 39-Bus system. Results demonstrate that, GLS is not reliant on wireless CSI, and can combat attackers that have partial networked dynamic knowledge (realistic access to full dynamic and critical nodes remains challenging). We believe this novel GLS has widespread applicability in secure health monitoring and for Digital Twins in adversarial radio environments.
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