战略冲突背景下的文化进化模型
A model of cultural evolution in the context of strategic conflict
摘要:
我们考虑一个模型的文化进化的策略选择的人口中的个人谁互动的博弈论框架。进化结合了个体对环境的学习(种群策略概况)、繁殖(与所获得知识的成功成比例)以及知识向下一代的社会传播。一个平均场型方程的推导,描述了动态的文化特征的分布,在学习率,繁殖率和人口规模。我们建立了这个方程的初边值问题的整体适定性,并给出了几个例子来说明一些经典游戏的文化演变过程。
英文摘要:
We consider a model of cultural evolution for a strategy selection in a population of individuals who interact in a game theoretic framework. The evolution combines individual learning of the environment (population strategy profile), reproduction, proportional to the success of the acquired knowledge, and social transmission of the knowledge to the next generation. A mean-field type equation is derived that describes the dynamics of the distribution of cultural traits, in terms of the rate of learning, the reproduction rate and population size. We establish global well-posedness of the initial-boundary value problem for this equation and give several examples that illustrate the process of the cultural evolution for some classical games.
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