竞争性社会中的自我诱导阶级分层：存在嫉妒时的纳什稳定性
Self induced class stratification in competitive societies of agents: Nash stability in the presence of envy
摘要：
在竞争性社会中，当报酬差异方面的不平等产生时，嫉妒，即比较报酬的倾向，可以预期会出现。它表明，不断增加的嫉妒水平不可避免地导致一个自我诱导的分离成一个较低的和一个上层阶级。阶级分层是纳什稳定和严格的，同一个阶级的成员获得相同的奖励。上层智能体只采用纯策略，所有下层智能体采用相同的混合策略。上层阶级代理人的比例随着嫉妒水平的增加而逐渐减少，直到只剩下一个上层阶级代理人。数值模拟和一个完整的分析处理的基本参考模型，购物的麻烦模型，提出。阶级分层社会的属性是普遍的，只能通过潜在的效用函数间接控制，这意味着阶级分层社会本质上是抵抗政治控制的。对人类社会的影响进行了讨论。有人指出，当社会变得越来越有竞争力时，嫉妒的影响会被放大。
英文摘要：
Envy, the inclination to compare rewards, can be expected to unfold when inequalities in terms of payoff differences are generated in competitive societies. It is shown that increasing levels of envy lead inevitably to a self-induced separation into a lower and an upper class. Class stratification is Nash stable and strict, with members of the same class receiving identical rewards. Upper class agents play exclusively pure strategies, all lower class agents the same mixed strategy. The fraction of upper class agents decreases progressively with larger levels of envy, until a single upper class agent is left. Numerical simulations and a complete analytic treatment of a basic reference model, the shopping trouble model, are presented. The properties of the class-stratified society are universal and only indirectly controllable through the underlying utility function, which implies that class stratified societies are intrinsically resistant to political control. Implications for human societies are discussed. It is pointed out that the repercussions of envy are amplified when societies become increasingly competitive.
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