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arXiv 2005.07675eess.SPcs.LGcs.NIstat.ML
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如何让5G通信“隐形”:对抗性机器学习用于无线隐私

How to Make 5G Communications "Invisible": Adversarial Machine Learning for Wireless Privacy

University of Maryland(马里兰大学);Intelligent Automation, Inc.(智能自动化公司)

Brian Kim, Yalin E. Sagduyu, Kemal Davaslioglu, Tugba Erpek, Sennur Ulukus

摘要:

我们考虑的问题隐藏无线通信从窃听者,采用深度学习(DL)分类器来检测是否存在任何感兴趣的传输。存在一个发射机,在窃听者存在的情况下向其接收机发送,而合作干扰机(CJ)通过空中发送精心制作的对抗性扰动,以欺骗窃听者将接收到的信号叠加归类为噪声。CJ对扰动信号的强度设置上限,以限制其对接收机处的误比特率(BER)的影响。我们表明,这种对抗性的扰动导致窃听者误分类接收到的信号作为噪声的概率很高,而增加的BER只有轻微的。另一方面,CJ无法像传统干扰那样通过简单地传输高斯噪声来欺骗窃听者,而是需要通过对抗性机器学习构建扰动信号来实现隐蔽通信。我们的研究结果表明,具有不同调制类型的信号以及最终的5G通信可以有效地隐藏在窃听者的视线之外,即使它配备了DL分类器来检测传输。

英文摘要:

We consider the problem of hiding wireless communications from an eavesdropper that employs a deep learning (DL) classifier to detect whether any transmission of interest is present or not. There exists one transmitter that transmits to its receiver in the presence of an eavesdropper, while a cooperative jammer (CJ) transmits carefully crafted adversarial perturbations over the air to fool the eavesdropper into classifying the received superposition of signals as noise. The CJ puts an upper bound on the strength of perturbation signal to limit its impact on the bit error rate (BER) at the receiver. We show that this adversarial perturbation causes the eavesdropper to misclassify the received signals as noise with high probability while increasing the BER only slightly. On the other hand, the CJ cannot fool the eavesdropper by simply transmitting Gaussian noise as in conventional jamming and instead needs to craft perturbation signals built by adversarial machine learning to enable covert communications. Our results show that signals with different modulation types and eventually 5G communications can be effectively hidden from an eavesdropper even if it is equipped with a DL classifier to detect transmissions.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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