arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2005.06691math.CO
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单边Gale-Shapley算法及其在随机偏好下的可能行为

One-sided version of Gale-Shapley proposal algorithm and its likely behavior under random preferences

Boris Pittel

摘要:

对于一个双边($n$男性/ $n$女性)稳定匹配问题,盖尔和沙普利研究了一个提议算法(男性提议/女性选择,或相反),该算法确定匹配,而不是被任何不匹配的配对所阻止。Irving将此算法用作他的算法的第一阶段,用于$n$代理的单侧(稳定室友)匹配问题。我们分析了一个完全扩展版本的欧文的建议算法,运行所有的方式,直到每个代理持有一个建议或代理被拒绝的代理的偏好列表上的每个人。它表明,终端,有向,伙伴关系形成一个稳定的排列与匹配对保持匹配的任何其他稳定排列。假设所有$n$的排名是独立的统一的建议算法的可能行为进行了研究。证明了以高概率(w. h. p.)每个代理都有一个合作伙伴,以及在周期长度为$\ge 3$的代理的数量和稳定匹配的总数在概率上是有界的。W. H. P.提案总数渐近于$0.5 n^{3/2}$。

英文摘要:

For a two-sided ($n$ men/$n$ women) stable matching problem) Gale and Shapley studied a proposal algorithm (men propose/women select, or the other way around), that determines a matching, not blocked by any unmatched pair. Irving used this algorithm as a first phase of his algorithm for one-sided (stable roommates) matching problem with $n$ agents. We analyze a fully extended version of Irving's proposal algorithm that runs all the way until either each agent holds a proposal or an agent gets rejected by everybody on the agent's preference list. It is shown that the terminal, directed, partnerships form a stable permutation with matched pairs remaining matched in any other stable permutation. A likely behavior of the proposal algorithm is studied under assumption that all $n$ rankings are independently uniform. It is proved that with high probability (w.h.p.) every agent has a partner, and that both the number of agents in cycles of length $\ge 3$ and the total number of stable matchings are bounded in probability. W.h.p. the total number of proposals is asymptotic to $0.5 n^{3/2}$.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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