一种实用的基于Hash的MAC加密算法
Practical Hash-based Anonymity for MAC Addresses
摘要：
由于MAC地址可以唯一地识别一个人或一辆车，在大的地理范围内的连续跟踪已经引起了政府和公众对隐私的严重关注。先前的工作已经表明，简单的基于哈希的匿名化方法可以很容易地被逆转，由于小的搜索空间的MAC地址。具体地，可以用39位表示整个分配的MAC地址空间，并且基于频率的攻击允许用31位枚举50%的MAC地址。我们提出了一个实用的方法，MAC地址匿名化使用计算昂贵的哈希函数和截断产生的哈希，以允许k-匿名。我们提供了一个表达式来计算预期冲突的百分比，表明对于24位的MAC地址，可以存储多达168，617个MAC地址，冲突率小于1%。我们通过实验证明，通过存储13位中的100个MAC地址、17位中的1，000个MAC地址和20位中的10，000个MAC地址的数据集，可以实现1%或更低的冲突率。
英文摘要：
Given that a MAC address can uniquely identify a person or a vehicle, continuous tracking over a large geographical scale has raised serious privacy concerns amongst governments and the general public. Prior work has demonstrated that simple hash-based approaches to anonymization can be easily inverted due to the small search space of MAC addresses. In particular, it is possible to represent the entire allocated MAC address space in 39 bits and that frequency-based attacks allow for 50% of MAC addresses to be enumerated in 31 bits. We present a practical approach to MAC address anonymization using both computationally expensive hash functions and truncating the resulting hashes to allow for k-anonymity. We provide an expression for computing the percentage of expected collisions, demonstrating that for digests of 24 bits it is possible to store up to 168,617 MAC addresses with the rate of collisions less than 1%. We experimentally demonstrate that a rate of collision of 1% or less can be achieved by storing data sets of 100 MAC addresses in 13 bits, 1,000 MAC addresses in 17 bits and 10,000 MAC addresses in 20 bits.
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