最后一道防线的背后--抵御SoC故障和入侵
Behind the Last Line of Defense -- Surviving SoC Faults and Intrusions
摘要：
如今，利用众核片上系统（SoC）的巨大模块化功能、多样性和灵活性需要仔细协调复杂的资源，这是一项留给底层软件（例如虚拟机管理程序）的任务。在当前的架构中，该软件形成了单点故障和值得攻击的目标：一旦受到攻击，对手就可以访问所有信息并完全控制其控制的平台和环境。本文提出了Midir，一个增强的众核架构，实现了从SoC到分布式SoC的范式转变。Midir改变了平台资源的控制方式，通过众所周知的机制改造基于瓦片的故障遏制，同时确保所有关键操作的低开销基于法定人数的共识，特别是权限管理，从而控制域的管理。Midir允许多功能冗余管理，可提高所有软件级别（包括低级别）的恢复能力。我们解释这种架构，其相关的算法和硬件机制，并显示，拜占庭容错微管理程序的例子，它优于一个数量级的高效MinBFT。
英文摘要：
Today, leveraging the enormous modular power, diversity and flexibility of manycore systems-on-a-chip (SoCs) requires careful orchestration of complex resources, a task left to low-level software, e.g. hypervisors. In current architectures, this software forms a single point of failure and worthwhile target for attacks: once compromised, adversaries gain access to all information and full control over the platform and the environment it controls. This paper proposes Midir, an enhanced manycore architecture, effecting a paradigm shift from SoCs to distributed SoCs. Midir changes the way platform resources are controlled, by retrofitting tile-based fault containment through well known mechanisms, while securing low-overhead quorum-based consensus on all critical operations, in particular privilege management and, thus, management of containment domains. Allowing versatile redundancy management, Midir promotes resilience for all software levels, including at low level. We explain this architecture, its associated algorithms and hardware mechanisms and show, for the example of a Byzantine fault tolerant microhypervisor, that it outperforms the highly efficient MinBFT by one order of magnitude.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
