加密进程不敏感的不干扰和解密
Reconciling progress-insensitive noninterference and declassification
摘要:
安全信息流的实践者经常面临一个设计挑战:通过终止的泄漏的正确语义处理是什么?一方面,不受信任的代码的潜在危害需要强大的进度敏感安全性。另一方面,当代码被信任不会积极地利用终止通道时,实际问题(如强制执行的许可)使解决较弱的、对进度不敏感的安全性成为可能。然而,这种二进制情况并没有为混合可信和不可信代码的系统提供合适的中间点。本文通过将进展不敏感性重新定义为解密的一种特殊形式,将这两个极端联系起来。我们的新语义条件调和进度不敏感的安全性作为解密绑定在所谓的进度知识,否则进度或时间敏感的设置。我们展示了如何使用一个标准的信息流监控器来合理地执行新的条件。我们相信,在这项工作中建立的联系,将使其他应用程序的想法,从文献解密进展不敏感。
英文摘要:
Practitioners of secure information flow often face a design challenge: what is the right semantic treatment of leaks via termination? On the one hand, the potential harm of untrusted code calls for strong progress-sensitive security. On the other hand, when the code is trusted to not aggressively exploit termination channels, practical concerns, such as permissiveness of the enforcement, make a case for settling for weaker, progress-insensitive security. This binary situation, however, provides no suitable middle point for systems that mix trusted and untrusted code. This paper connects the two extremes by reframing progress-insensitivity as a particular form of declassification. Our novel semantic condition reconciles progress-insensitive security as a declassification bound on the so-called progress knowledge in an otherwise progress or timing sensitive setting. We show how the new condition can be soundly enforced using a mostly standard information-flow monitor. We believe that the connection established in this work will enable other applications of ideas from the literature on declassification to progress insensitivity.
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