动态一致的客观理性与主观理性
Dynamically Consistent Objective and Subjective Rationality
摘要：
一组专家，例如气候科学家，将在$f$和$g$两种政策中进行选择。考虑以下决策规则。如果所有专家都认为$f$的期望效用高于$g$的期望效用，则应用一致性规则，并选择$f$。否则，实施预防原则，并选择产生最高最小期望效用的策略。当增加一个部分解决不确定性的中间时期时，这一决策规则可能导致时间不一致。我们提供的公理，扩大了最初的专家组否决权，这导致了一组概率的信念，是“矩形”在最小的意义上。这使得这个决策规则动态一致，并提供了一个新的矩形行为表征的副产品。
英文摘要：
A group of experts, for instance climate scientists, is to choose among two policies $f$ and $g$. Consider the following decision rule. If all experts agree that the expected utility of $f$ is higher than the expected utility of $g$, the unanimity rule applies, and $f$ is chosen. Otherwise the precautionary principle is implemented and the policy yielding the highest minimal expected utility is chosen. This decision rule may lead to time inconsistencies when an intermediate period of partial resolution of uncertainty is added. We provide axioms that enlarge the initial group of experts with veto power, which leads to a set of probabilistic beliefs that is "rectangular" in a minimal sense. This makes this decision rule dynamically consistent and provides, as a byproduct, a novel behavioral characterization of rectangularity.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
