损失厌恶与政策干预的福利排序
Loss aversion and the welfare ranking of policy interventions
AI总结：
本文提出损失厌恶敏感支配标准及非参数检验方法，用于在个体损失厌恶下对政策干预进行福利排序，并应用于美国收入支持项目比较。
摘要：
本文在个体具有损失厌恶特征时，发展了用于按福利对政策干预进行排序的理论标准与计量经济学方法。我们提出的“损失厌恶敏感支配”新标准，定义了政策引致收益与损失分布的弱偏序关系。该标准适用于一类福利函数，这类函数以非递减且对结果变化持损失厌恶态度的方式对个体偏好进行建模。我们还开发了新的统计方法，利用非参数插入估计在实践中检验损失厌恶敏感支配；这些方法允许通过一种特殊的重采样程序进行推断。由于政策引致收益与损失分布的逐点识别可能需要强假设，我们将比较标准、检验统计量及重采样程序扩展到部分识别的情形。我们通过一个简单的实证应用——对美国替代性收入支持项目的福利比较——来展示我们的方法。
英文摘要：
This paper develops theoretical criteria and econometric methods to rank policy interventions in terms of welfare when individuals are loss-averse. Our new criterion for "loss aversion-sensitive dominance" defines a weak partial ordering of the distributions of policy-induced gains and losses. It applies to the class of welfare functions which model individual preferences with non-decreasing and loss-averse attitudes towards changes in outcomes. We also develop new statistical methods to test loss aversion-sensitive dominance in practice, using nonparametric plug-in estimates; these allow inference to be conducted through a special resampling procedure. Since point-identification of the distribution of policy-induced gains and losses may require strong assumptions, we extend our comparison criteria, test statistics, and resampling procedures to the partially-identified case. We illustrate our methods with a simple empirical application to the welfare comparison of alternative income support programs in the US.
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