关系风险模型的博弈论应用
Game-theoretic applications of a relational risk model
摘要：
该报告提出了风险的概念，概述了风险成因所需的两个数学结构：一组的结果，并在一般情况下，偏序的偏好it.It表明，这最小偏序应构成的半格的结构。在某些情况下，应该存在一个以某种方式嵌套的半格系统。在此基础上，给出了数学知识专业化背景下的风险理论任务分类。换句话说，我们正在讨论一种新的相对风险理论的发展。博弈论中的政治决策问题，即在形成一个特定的嵌套半格系统的博弈中，每个参与者在结果集上具有偏序偏好，被认为是关系风险概念实现的一个例子。通过使用各种最优性原理得到的问题的解决方案进行调查。
英文摘要：
The report suggests the concept of risk, outlining two mathematical structures necessary for risk genesis: the set of outcomes and, in a general case, partial order of preference on it. It is shown that this minimum partial order should constitute the structure of a semilattice. In some cases, there should be a system of semilattices nested in a certain way. On this basis, the classification of risk theory tasks is given in the context of specialization of mathematical knowledge. In other words, we are talking about the development of a new rela-tional risk theory. The problem of political decision making in game-theoretic formulation in terms of having partial order of preference on the set of outcomes for each par-ticipant of the game forming a certain system of nested semilattices is consid-ered as an example of a relational risk concept implementation. Solutions to the problem obtained through the use of various optimality principles are investi-gated.
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