倒卖信息

摘要：

信息是可复制的，因为它可以同时被消费和出售给他人。我们研究转售如何影响分散的信息市场。我们表明，即使最初的卖方是一个信息垄断者，她捕获非平凡的租金从最多一个单一的买家：她的收益收敛到0，只要一个单一的买家购买信息。相比之下，如果卖方也可以出售无价值的代币，则存在“预付均衡”，即在信息商品发布之前从所有买方处提取付款。通过利用转售的可能性，这种提前支付均衡使卖方获得了与禁止转售时一样高的收益。

英文摘要：

Information is replicable in that it can be simultaneously consumed and sold to others. We study how resale affects a decentralized market for information. We show that even if the initial seller is an informational monopolist, she captures non-trivial rents from at most a single buyer: her payoffs converge to 0 as soon as a single buyer has bought information. By contrast, if the seller can also sell valueless tokens, there exists a ``prepay equilibrium'' where payment is extracted from all buyers before the information good is released. By exploiting resale possibilities, this prepay equilibrium gives the seller as high a payoff as she would achieve if resale were prohibited.

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