改进的EU委员会投票规则维度下界
Improved lower bound on the dimension of the EU council's voting rules
摘要：
Kurz和Napel（2015）证明了欧盟理事会的投票系统（基于2014年人口数据）不能表示为六个加权博弈的交集，即，其尺寸至少为7。这为现实世界的投票规则创造了新的记录，作者提出了确切的决定作为一个挑战。最近，Chen，Cheung和Ng（2019）表明维度最多为24。我们提供了第一个改进的下界，并表明，维数至少是8。
英文摘要：
Kurz and Napel (2015) proved that the voting system of the EU council (based on the 2014 population data) cannot be represented as the intersection of six weighted games, i.e., its dimension is at least 7. This set a new record for real-world voting rules and the authors posed the exact determination as a challenge. Recently, Chen, Cheung, and Ng (2019) showed that the dimension is at most 24. We provide the first improved lower bound and show that the dimension is at least 8.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
