自私的无用--自私路径对不协调优化运输网络的影响
The Futility of Being Selfish -- The Impact of Selfish Routing on Uncoordinated and Optimized Transportation Networks
摘要:
优化交通流对于缓解拥堵至关重要。然而,即使提供了全球最佳、协调和个性化的路线,用户也可以选择提供较低个人成本的替代路线。通过分析自私路径选择对网络性能的影响,发现小比例的自私路径选择可以提高不协调交通网络的全局性能,但会降低优化系统的效率。值得注意的是,在某些参数条件下,顺从用户总是在前者中获益,自私用户可能在后者中获益。理论结果与大规模模拟结果吻合良好。一小部分自私用户的迭代路由切换导致纳什均衡接近全局最优路由解决方案。我们的理论框架还概括了腔方法的使用,最初开发的平衡态的研究,分析迭代博弈论问题。这些结果揭示了当并非所有车辆都遵循协调路线时,通过路线协调来缓解拥堵的可行性。
英文摘要:
Optimizing traffic flow is essential for easing congestion. However, even when globally-optimal, coordinated and individualized routes are provided, users may choose alternative routes which offer lower individual costs. By analyzing the impact of selfish route-choices on performance using the cavity method, we find that a small ratio of selfish route-choices improves the global performance of uncoordinated transportation networks, but degrades the efficiency of optimized systems. Remarkably, compliant users always gain in the former and selfish users may gain in the latter, under some parameter conditions. The theoretical results are in good agreement with large-scale simulations. Iterative route-switching by a small fraction of selfish users leads to Nash equilibria close to the globally optimal routing solution. Our theoretical framework also generalizes the use of the cavity method, originally developed for the study of equilibrium states, to analyze iterative game-theoretical problems. These results shed light on the feasibility of easing congestion by route coordination when not all vehicles follow the coordinated routes.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。