TimingCamouflage +:具有非常规时序的网表安全增强(附附录)
TimingCamouflage+: Netlist Security Enhancement with Unconventional Timing (with Appendix)
摘要:
随着逆向工程的最新进展,攻击者可以通过打开芯片并扫描所有层的真实芯片来重建网表以伪造芯片。这种相对容易的伪造通过使用标准的简单时钟方案而成为可能,其中所有组合块在一个时钟周期内起作用,使得组合逻辑门和触发器的网表足以复制设计。在本文中,我们提出了无效的假设,网表完全代表了非常规时序电路的功能。利用引入的波形流水路径,攻击者必须在逆向工程期间捕获门和互连延迟,或者测试大量的组合路径以识别波形流水路径。为了阻止基于测试的攻击,我们构造虚假路径与波流水线,以增加伪造的挑战。实验结果表明,波形流水线的真路径和假路径可以在基准电路中成功地构建,只有一个微不足道的成本,从而挫败了潜在的攻击技术。
英文摘要:
With recent advances in reverse engineering, attackers can reconstruct a netlist to counterfeit chips by opening the die and scanning all layers of authentic chips. This relatively easy counterfeiting is made possible by the use of the standard simple clocking scheme, where all combinational blocks function within one clock period, so that a netlist of combinational logic gates and flip-flops is sufficient to duplicate a design. In this paper, we propose to invalidate the assumption that a netlist completely represents the function of a circuit with unconventional timing. With the introduced wave-pipelining paths, attackers have to capture gate and interconnect delays during reverse engineering, or to test a huge number of combinational paths to identify the wave-pipelining paths. To hinder the test-based attack, we construct false paths with wave-pipelining to increase the counterfeiting challenge. Experimental results confirm that wave-pipelining true paths and false paths can be constructed in benchmark circuits successfully with only a negligible cost, thus thwarting the potential attack techniques.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。