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arXiv 2003.00003cs.CR

Toward Active and Passive Confidentiality Attacks On Cryptocurrency Off-Chain Networks

Utz Nisslmueller, Klaus-Tycho Foerster, Stefan Schmid, Christian Decker

英文摘要:

Cryptocurrency off-chain networks such as Lightning (e.g., Bitcoin) or Raiden (e.g., Ethereum) aim to increase the scalability of traditional on-chain transactions. To support nodes in learning about possible paths to route their transactions, these networks need to provide gossip and probing mechanisms. This paper explores whether these mechanisms may be exploited to infer sensitive information about the flow of transactions, and eventually harm privacy. In particular, we identify two threats, related to an active and a passive adversary. The first is a probing attack: here the adversary aims to detect the maximum amount which is transferable in a given direction over a target channel by actively probing it and differentiating the response messages it receives. The second is a timing attack: the adversary discovers how close the destination of a routed payment actually is, by acting as a passive man-in-the middle and analyzing the time deltas between sent messages and their corresponding responses. We then analyze the limitations of these attacks and propose remediations for scenarios in which they are able to produce accurate results.

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