基于基尼指数的首次代币发行机制
Gini Index based Initial Coin Offering Mechanism
摘要：
作为一种融资方式，首次代币发行（ICO）在过去两年中为数千家初创公司筹集了数十亿美元。现有的ICO机制更多地强调最大化筹资的短期利益，而忽视了代币分配不平衡的问题，这对后续筹资产生了负面影响，并对引入新的投资者和资源产生了不良影响。我们提出了一种新的ICO机制，首次使用基尼指数的概念作为机制设计约束，以控制分配不平等。我们的机制保持了一个优雅和简单的结构。它允许代理人修改他们的出价作为价格发现过程，同时限制鲸鱼的出价。我们分析了在我们的机制下，代理人的均衡行为。在自然的技术假设下，我们证明了大多数代理人都有简单的优势策略，并且均衡收益在代理人数量上渐近地接近最优收益。我们使用我们收集的真实ICO数据集验证了我们的机制，并确认我们的机制在分配公平性和收入方面表现良好。
英文摘要：
As a fundraising method, Initial Coin Offering (ICO) has raised billions of dollars for thousands of startups in the past two years. Existing ICO mechanisms place more emphasis on the short-term benefits of maximal fundraising while ignoring the problem of unbalanced token allocation, which negatively impacts subsequent fundraising and has bad effects on introducing new investors and resources. We propose a new ICO mechanism which uses the concept of Gini index for the very first time as a mechanism design constraint to control allocation inequality. Our mechanism maintains an elegant and straightforward structure. It allows the agents to modify their bids as a price discovery process, while limiting the bids of whales. We analyze the agents' equilibrium behaviors under our mechanism. Under natural technical assumptions, we show that most agents have simple dominant strategies and the equilibrium revenue approaches the optimal revenue asymptotically in the number of agents. We verify our mechanism using real ICO dataset we collected, and confirm that our mechanism performs well in terms of both allocation fairness and revenue.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
