在与主要参与者的平均场博弈中的战略优势
Strategic advantages in mean field games with a major player
摘要：
本文讨论了平均场博弈理论中的一个建模问题。我们展示了如何模拟平均场游戏，涉及一个主要的球员，具有战略优势，而只允许闭环马尔可夫策略的所有球员。我们通过三个例子来说明这个属性。
英文摘要：
This note is concerned with a modeling question arising from the mean field games theory. We show how to model mean field games involving a major player which has a strategic advantage, while only allowing closed loop markovian strategies for all the players. We illustrate this property through three examples.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
