Decentralization is a key indicator for the evaluation of public blockchains. In the past, there have been very few studies on measuring and comparing the actual level of decentralization between Proof-of-Work (PoW) blockchains and blockchains with other consensus protocols. This paper presents a new comparison study of the level of decentralization in Bitcoin and Steem, a prominent Delegated-Proof-of-Stake (DPoS) blockchain. Our study particularly focuses on analysing the power that decides the creators of blocks in the blockchain. In Bitcoin, miners with higher computational power generate more blocks. In contrast, blocks in Steem are equally generated by witnesses while witnesses are periodically elected by stakeholders with different voting power weighted by invested stake. We analyze the process of stake-weighted election of witnesses in DPoS and measure the actual stake invested by each stakeholder in Steem. We then compute the Shannon entropy of the distribution of computational power among miners in Bitcoin and the distribution of invested stake among stakeholders in Steem. Our analyses reveal that neither Bitcoin nor Steem is dominantly better than the other with respect to decentralization. Compared with Steem, Bitcoin tends to be more decentralized among top miners but less decentralized in general. Our study is designed to provide insights into the current state of the degree of decentralization in DPoS and PoW blockchains. We believe that the methodologies and findings in this paper can facilitate future studies of decentralization in other blockchain systems employing different consensus protocols.
Recently, many Delegated Proof-of-Stake (DPoS)-based blockchains have been widely used in decentralized applications, such as EOSIO, Tron, and Binance Smart Chain. Compared with traditional PoW-based blockchain systems, these systems achieve a higher transaction throughput and are well adapted to large-scale scenes in daily applications. Decentralization is a key element in blockchain networks. However, little is known about the evolution of decentralization in DPoS-based blockchain networks. In this paper, we conduct a systematic analysis on the decentralization of DPoS with data from up to 1…
Bitcoin uses blockchain technology and proof-of-work (PoW) mechanism where nodes spend computing resources and earn rewards in return for spending these resources. This incentive system has caused power to be significantly biased towards a few nodes, called mining pools. In fact, poor decentralization appears not only in PoW-based coins but also in coins adopting other mechanisms such as proof-of-stake (PoS) and delegated proof-of-stake (DPoS). In this paper, we target this centralization issue. To this end, we first define (m, \varepsilon, δ)-decentralization as a state that satisfies 1) ther…
Decentralization, which has backed the hyper growth of many blockchains, comes at the cost of scalability. To understand this fundamental limitation, this paper proposes a quantitative measure of blockchain decentralization, and discusses its implications to various trust models and consensus algorithms. Further, we identify the major challenges in blockchain decentralization. Our key findings are that true decentralization is hard to achieve due to the skewed mining power and that a fully decentralized blockchain inherently limits scalability as it incurs a throughput upper bound and prevents…
Proof of work cryptocurrencies began with the promise of a more egalitarian future with a decentralized monetary system with no powerful entities in charge. While this vision is far from realized, these cryptocurrencies are still touted to be much more decentralized than traditional centralized systems. While it is well understood that cryptocurrencies are centralized, it is still unclear what the underlying causes are. This work aims to address this gap and examines some of the forces behind mining centralization. The internals of cryptocurrency mining is very opaque and difficult to study si…
Bitcoin mining presents a significant economic incentive for efficient hashing and broadcast of data, both parameters stemming from the Proofs of Work used to advance the network. This incentive has led to the development of Bitcoin specific application specific integrated circuits and centralized mining pools, undermining the decentralized motivations behind Bitcoin's design. In addition, the imminent block reward halving threatens the profitability of mining at any scale. Some work has been done in formal models for miner profitability, but existing models do not account for conditions such …
Decentralization has been widely acknowledged as a core virtue of blockchains. However, in the past, there have been few measurement studies on measuring and comparing the actual level of decentralization between existing blockchains using multiple metrics and granularities. This paper presents a new comparison study of the degree of decentralization in Bitcoin and Ethereum, the two most prominent blockchains, with various decentralization metrics and different granularities within the time dimension. Specifically, we measure the degree of decentralization in the two blockchains during 2019 by…
A blockchain is a decentralized ledger where all transactions are recorded. For having a reliable blockchain and double-spending prevention, we need a decentralized consensus and agreement on a blockchain. Bitcoin uses proof-of-work (PoW). It is a cryptographic puzzle that is difficult to solve but easy to verify. However, because of significant latency of proof-of-work for transactions confirmation, this consensus mechanism is vulnerable against double-spending. On the other hand, PoW consumes a significant amount of energy that by growing the network, it becomes a major problematic of this c…
Bitcoin introduced delegation of control over a monetary system from a select few to all who participate in that system. This delegation is known as the decentralization of controlling power and is a powerful security mechanism for the ecosystem. After the introduction of Bitcoin, the field of cryptocurrency has seen widespread attention from industry and academia, so much so that the original novel contribution of Bitcoin i.e. decentralization, may be overlooked, due to decentralizations assumed fundamental existence for the functioning of such cryptoassets. However recent studies have observ…
In Proof-of-Work (PoW) blockchains, the average waiting time to generate a block is inversely proportional to the computing power of the miner. To reduce the average block generation time, a group of individual miners can form a mining pool to aggregate their computing power to solve the puzzle together and share the reward contained in the block. However, if the aggregated computing power of the pool forms a substantial portion of the total computing power in the network, the pooled mining undermines the core spirit of blockchain, i.e., the decentralization, and harms its security. To discour…
The desire to overcome reliability issues of distributed energy resources (DERs) lead researchers to development of a novel concept named as virtual power plant (VPP). VPPs are supposed to carry out intelligent, secure, and smart energy trading among prosumers, buyers, and generating stations along with providing efficient energy management. Therefore, integrating blockchain in a decentralized VPP network emerged as a new paradigm, and recent experiments over this integration have shown fruitful results. However, this decentralization also suffers with energy management, trust, reliability, an…
Blockchain applications that rely on the Proof-of-Work (PoW) have increasingly become energy inefficient with a staggering carbon footprint. In contrast, energy-efficient alternative consensus protocols such as Proof-of-Stake (PoS) may cause centralization and unfairness in the blockchain system. To address these challenges, we propose a modular version of PoS-based blockchain systems called epos that resists the centralization of network resources by extending mining opportunities to a wider set of stakeholders. Moreover, epos leverages the in-built system operations to promote fair mining pr…
While Proof-of-Work (PoW) is the most widely used consensus mechanism for blockchain, it received harsh criticism due to its massive waste of energy for meaningless hash calculation. Some studies have introduced Proof-of-Stake to address this issue. However, such protocols widen the gap between rich and poor and in the worst case lead to an oligopoly, where the rich control the entire network. Other studies have attempted to translate the energy consumption of PoW into useful work, but they have many limitations, such as narrow application scope, serious security issues and impractical incenti…
Initiated from Nakamoto's Bitcoin system, blockchain technology has demonstrated great capability of building secure consensus among decentralized parties at Internet-scale, i.e., without relying on any centralized trusted party. Nowadays, blockchain systems find applications in various fields. But the performance is increasingly becoming a bottleneck, especially when permissionless participation is retained for full decentralization. In this work, we present a new consensus protocol named GHAST (Greedy Heaviest Adaptive Sub-Tree) which organizes blocks in a Tree-Graph structure (i.e., a direc…
We analyze Bitcoin mining from the perspective of a game and propose an optimal mining model that maximizes profits of pools and miners. The model is a two-stage Stackelberg game in which each stage forms a sub-game. In stage I, pools are the leaders who assign a computing power to be consumed by miners. In stage II, miners decide of their power consumption and distribution. They find themselves in a social dilemma in which they must choose between mining in solo, therefore prioritizing their individual preferences, and participating in a pool for the collective interest. The model relies on a…
