BRIGHTNESS：通过屏幕亮度泄漏气隙工作站的敏感数据
BRIGHTNESS: Leaking Sensitive Data from Air-Gapped Workstations via Screen Brightness
摘要：
气隙计算机是与Internet隔离的系统，因为它们存储或处理敏感信息。在本文中，我们介绍了一个光学隐蔽通道，其中攻击者可以泄漏（或，exfillrate）敏感信息从空气间隙计算机通过操纵屏幕亮度。这种隐蔽通道是不可见的，即使用户在计算机上工作时也能工作。受感染计算机上的恶意软件可以获取敏感数据（例如，文件、图像、加密密钥和密码），并在屏幕亮度范围内进行调制，用户无法看到。亮度的微小变化对人类来说是不可见的，但可以从本地安全摄像头、智能手机摄像头或网络摄像头等摄像头拍摄的视频流中恢复。我们目前的相关工作，并讨论了这种隐蔽通道的技术和科学背景。我们检查了不同参数下的通道边界，不同类型的计算机和电视屏幕，并在几个距离。我们还测试了不同类型的摄像机接收器，以证明隐蔽通道。最后，针对这类攻击提出了相应的对策。最后，针对这类攻击提出了相应的对策。
英文摘要：
Air-gapped computers are systems that are kept isolated from the Internet since they store or process sensitive information. In this paper, we introduce an optical covert channel in which an attacker can leak (or, exfiltlrate) sensitive information from air-gapped computers through manipulations on the screen brightness. This covert channel is invisible and it works even while the user is working on the computer. Malware on a compromised computer can obtain sensitive data (e.g., files, images, encryption keys and passwords), and modulate it within the screen brightness, invisible to users. The small changes in the brightness are invisible to humans but can be recovered from video streams taken by cameras such as a local security camera, smartphone camera or a webcam. We present related work and discuss the technical and scientific background of this covert channel. We examined the channel's boundaries under various parameters, with different types of computer and TV screens, and at several distances. We also tested different types of camera receivers to demonstrate the covert channel. Lastly, we present relevant countermeasures to this type of attack. Lastly, we present relevant countermeasures to this type of attack.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
