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arXiv 2001.08850cs.GT
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一种非合作多址及时更新博弈模型

A Non-Cooperative Multiple Access Game for Timely Updates

Sneihil Gopal, Sanjit K. Kaul, Rakesh Chaturvedi, Sumit Roy

摘要:

我们考虑一个网络的自私节点,希望尽量减少年龄的更新在其他节点。节点使用基于CSMA/CA的接入机制在共享频谱上发送其更新。我们模拟产生的竞争作为一个非合作的一杆多路访问游戏,并调查两个不同的介质访问设置(a)冲突是短于成功的传输和(b)冲突更长的均衡策略。我们调查竞争的CSMA/CA时隙,其中一个节点可以选择发送或保持空闲。我们发现,媒体接入设置施加强烈的激励效果的节点。我们发现,当冲突较短,传输是一个弱主导的战略。这导致所有节点在CSMA/CA时隙中传输,因此保证了冲突。相反,当碰撞时间较长时,不存在弱优势策略,并且在一定的条件下,在时隙开始时的年龄,我们得到了混合策略纳什均衡。

英文摘要:

We consider a network of selfish nodes that would like to minimize the age of their updates at the other nodes. The nodes send their updates over a shared spectrum using a CSMA/CA based access mechanism. We model the resulting competition as a non-cooperative one-shot multiple access game and investigate equilibrium strategies for two distinct medium access settings (a) collisions are shorter than successful transmissions and (b) collisions are longer. We investigate competition in a CSMA/CA slot, where a node may choose to transmit or stay idle. We find that medium access settings exert strong incentive effects on the nodes. We show that when collisions are shorter, transmit is a weakly dominant strategy. This leads to all nodes transmitting in the CSMA/CA slot, therefore guaranteeing a collision. In contrast, when collisions are longer, no weakly dominant strategy exists and under certain conditions on the ages at the beginning of the slot, we derive the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.

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