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arXiv 2001.04314cs.SE
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智能合约安全框架的形式化规范

Formal specification of a security framework for smart contracts

Mikhail Mandrykin, Jake O'Shannessy, Jacob Payne, Ilya Shchepetkov

摘要:

随着智能合约的规模和复杂性不断增长,确保其正确性和安全性变得越来越困难。由于缺乏隔离机制,代码中的一个错误或漏洞都可能导致整个系统崩溃,因此智能合约升级可能特别危险。确保智能合约安全性的传统方法,包括DSL,审计和静态分析,都是在代码部署到区块链之前使用的,因此在部署之后没有提供任何保护。每次升级后,整个代码都需要再次验证,这是一个困难而耗时的过程,很容易出错。为了解决这些问题,开发了一个名为Cap 9的智能合约安全协议和框架。它为开发人员提供了以安全和健壮的方式执行升级的能力,并通过使用基于功能的低级别安全模型来提高隔离性和透明度。我们使用Isabelle/HOL开发了Cap 9框架的形式化规范,并证明了其一致性。本文提出了一种基于细化的方法,我们用来创建规范,以及讨论在这个过程中遇到的一些困难。

英文摘要:

As smart contracts are growing in size and complexity, it becomes harder and harder to ensure their correctness and security. Due to the lack of isolation mechanisms a single mistake or vulnerability in the code can bring the whole system down, and due to this smart contract upgrades can be especially dangerous. Traditional ways to ensure the security of a smart contract, including DSLs, auditing and static analysis, are used before the code is deployed to the blockchain, and thus offer no protection after the deployment. After each upgrade the whole code need to be verified again, which is a difficult and time-consuming process that is prone to errors. To address these issues a security protocol and framework for smart contracts called Cap9 was developed. It provides developers the ability to perform upgrades in a secure and robust manner, and improves isolation and transparency through the use of a low level capability-based security model. We have used Isabelle/HOL to develop a formal specification of the Cap9 framework and prove its consistency. The paper presents a refinement-based approach that we used to create the specification, as well as discussion of some encountered difficulties during this process.

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