It is widely believed that sharing gradients will not leak private training data in distributed learning systems such as Collaborative Learning and Federated Learning, etc. Recently, Zhu et al. presented an approach which shows the possibility to obtain private training data from the publicly shared gradients. In their Deep Leakage from Gradient (DLG) method, they synthesize the dummy data and corresponding labels with the supervision of shared gradients. However, DLG has difficulty in convergence and discovering the ground-truth labels consistently. In this paper, we find that sharing gradients definitely leaks the ground-truth labels. We propose a simple but reliable approach to extract accurate data from the gradients. Particularly, our approach can certainly extract the ground-truth labels as opposed to DLG, hence we name it Improved DLG (iDLG). Our approach is valid for any differentiable model trained with cross-entropy loss over one-hot labels. We mathematically illustrate how our method can extract ground-truth labels from the gradients and empirically demonstrate the advantages over DLG.
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute（伦斯勒理工学院）；IBM Research（IBM研究院）；National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University（国立阳明交通大学）
Recent studies show that private training data can be leaked through the gradients sharing mechanism deployed in distributed machine learning systems, such as federated learning (FL). Increasing batch size to complicate data recovery is often viewed as a promising defense strategy against data leakage. In this paper, we revisit this defense premise and propose an advanced data leakage attack with theoretical justification to efficiently recover batch data from the shared aggregated gradients. We name our proposed method as catastrophic data leakage in vertical federated learning (CAFE). Compar…
School of Computing and Information Systems, University of Melbourne（墨尔本大学计算与信息系统学院）；Australian Tax Office（澳大利亚税务局）；School of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Melbourne（墨尔本大学数学与统计学院）
Blowfish privacy is a recent generalisation of differential privacy that enables improved utility while maintaining privacy policies with semantic guarantees, a factor that has driven the popularity of differential privacy in computer science. This paper relates Blowfish privacy to an important measure of privacy loss of information channels from the communications theory community: min-entropy leakage. Symmetry in an input data neighbouring relation is central to known connections between differential privacy and min-entropy leakage. But while differential privacy exhibits strong symmetry, Bl…
Federated learning (FL) is a popular distributed learning framework that can reduce privacy risks by not explicitly sharing private data. However, recent works demonstrated that sharing model updates makes FL vulnerable to inference attacks. In this work, we show our key observation that the data representation leakage from gradients is the essential cause of privacy leakage in FL. We also provide an analysis of this observation to explain how the data presentation is leaked. Based on this observation, we propose a defense against model inversion attack in FL. The key idea of our defense is le…
PAUSE: Low-Latency and Privacy-Aware Active User Selection for Federated Learning
School of ECE, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev（本·加里昂大学电子工程学院）；Department of ECE, National Yang-Ming Chiao-Tung University（National Yang-Ming Chiao-Tung大学电子工程系）
Yonsei University（延世大学）；Deakin University（迪肯大学）；MIT Media Lab（麻省理工学院媒体实验室）；University of Oulu（奥卢大学）
This article seeks for a distributed learning solution for the visual transformer (ViT) architectures. Compared to convolutional neural network (CNN) architectures, ViTs often have larger model sizes, and are computationally expensive, making federated learning (FL) ill-suited. Split learning (SL) can detour this problem by splitting a model and communicating the hidden representations at the split-layer, also known as smashed data. Notwithstanding, the smashed data of ViT are as large as and as similar as the input data, negating the communication efficiency of SL while violating data privacy…
Federated Learning (FL) enables multiple parties to distributively train a ML model without revealing their private datasets. However, it assumes trust in the centralized aggregator which stores and aggregates model updates. This makes it prone to gradient tampering and privacy leakage by a malicious aggregator. Malicious parties can also introduce backdoors into the joint model by poisoning the training data or model gradients. To address these issues, we present BEAS, the first blockchain-based framework for N-party FL that provides strict privacy guarantees of training data using gradient p…
Two-party split learning is a popular technique for learning a model across feature-partitioned data. In this work, we explore whether it is possible for one party to steal the private label information from the other party during split training, and whether there are methods that can protect against such attacks. Specifically, we first formulate a realistic threat model and propose a privacy loss metric to quantify label leakage in split learning. We then show that there exist two simple yet effective methods within the threat model that can allow one party to accurately recover private groun…
Los Alamos National Laboratory（洛斯阿拉莫斯国家实验室）；Kent State University（肯特州立大学）；Michigan State University（密歇根州立大学）
Deep learning and data-driven approaches have shown great potential in scientific domains. The promise of data-driven techniques relies on the availability of a large volume of high-quality training datasets. Due to the high cost of obtaining data through expensive physical experiments, instruments, and simulations, data augmentation techniques for scientific applications have emerged as a new direction for obtaining scientific data recently. However, existing data augmentation techniques originating from computer vision, yield physically unacceptable data samples that are not helpful for the …
