arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2001.00919q-fin.GNcs.DC
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股权投资与链上贷款之间的竞争均衡

Competitive equilibria between staking and on-chain lending

Tarun Chitra

摘要:

权益证明(PoS)是一种新兴的Sybil抵抗机制,旨在让数字资产(“令牌”)作为加密网络中的安全抵押品。然而,到目前为止,PoS还没有建立一个全面的威胁模型,其中包括来自分布式系统的拜占庭式攻击,以及由于代币作为支付手段和Sybil抵抗机制的双重使用而产生的金融攻击。特别是,衍生品市场的存在使得验证者之间的恶意协调比工作量证明系统更容易执行。我们证明,链上借贷智能合约也有可能蚕食PoS系统中的网络安全。当这些合约提供的收益率比抵押提供的通胀率更具吸引力时,抵押者往往会移除抵押的代币并将其借出,从而降低网络安全性。在本文中,我们提供了一个简单的随机模型,描述了不同风险偏好的理性验证者如何对股权和贷款回报的变化做出反应。对于这个模型的一个特定配置,我们提供了一个形式化的证明,证明了代币主要被抵押的均衡和代币主要被借出的均衡之间的相变。我们通过基于代理的模拟进一步验证了这种紧急对抗行为(例如减少抵押令牌供应),这些模拟在更现实的条件下对过渡进行采样。我们的研究结果表明,如果区块奖励没有被适当地校准到链上贷款的预期收益率之上,理性的、非对抗性的参与者可以大大降低PoS网络的安全性。

英文摘要:

Proof of Stake (PoS) is a burgeoning Sybil resistance mechanism that aims to have a digital asset ("token") serve as security collateral in crypto networks. However, PoS has so far eluded a comprehensive threat model that encompasses both Byzantine attacks from distributed systems and financial attacks that arise from the dual usage of the token as a means of payment and a Sybil resistance mechanism. In particular, the existence of derivatives markets makes malicious coordination among validators easier to execute than in Proof of Work systems. We demonstrate that it is also possible for on-chain lending smart contracts to cannibalize network security in PoS systems. When the yield provided by these contracts is more attractive than the inflation rate provided from staking, stakers will tend to remove their staked tokens and lend them out, thus reducing network security. In this paper, we provide a simple stochastic model that describes how rational validators with varying risk preferences react to changes in staking and lending returns. For a particular configuration of this model, we provide a formal proof of a phase transition between equilibria in which tokens are predominantly staked and those in which they are predominantly lent. We further validate this emergent adversarial behavior (e.g. reduced staked token supply) with agent-based simulations that sample transitions under more realistic conditions. Our results illustrate that rational, non-adversarial actors can dramatically reduce PoS network security if block rewards are not calibrated appropriately above the expected yields of on-chain lending.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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