arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2001.00329cs.AIcs.CYcs.LGstat.ML
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论结果主义与公平

On Consequentialism and Fairness

Stanford University(斯坦福大学);University of Washington(华盛顿大学);Allen Institute for AI(艾伦人工智能研究所)

Dallas Card, Noah A. Smith

摘要:

最近关于机器学习公平性的研究主要强调如何定义、量化和鼓励“公平”的结果。然而,对这些努力所依据的道德基础却关注较少。应该考虑的伦理观点之一是结果主义,粗略地说,结果才是最重要的。尽管结果主义并非没有困难,尽管它不一定提供一种选择行动的易处理的方法(因为不确定性、主观性和聚合的综合问题),但它仍然提供了一个强大的基础,可以用来批评现有的关于机器学习公平性的文献。此外,它还突出了一些涉及的权衡,包括谁重要的问题,使用政策的利弊,以及遥远未来的相对价值。在本文中,我们提供了一个结果主义的公平性的共同定义内的机器学习的批评,以及一个机器学习的结果主义的观点。最后,我们更广泛地讨论了学习和随机化的问题,这对自动化决策系统的道德有重要的影响。

英文摘要:

Recent work on fairness in machine learning has primarily emphasized how to define, quantify, and encourage "fair" outcomes. Less attention has been paid, however, to the ethical foundations which underlie such efforts. Among the ethical perspectives that should be taken into consideration is consequentialism, the position that, roughly speaking, outcomes are all that matter. Although consequentialism is not free from difficulties, and although it does not necessarily provide a tractable way of choosing actions (because of the combined problems of uncertainty, subjectivity, and aggregation), it nevertheless provides a powerful foundation from which to critique the existing literature on machine learning fairness. Moreover, it brings to the fore some of the tradeoffs involved, including the problem of who counts, the pros and cons of using a policy, and the relative value of the distant future. In this paper we provide a consequentialist critique of common definitions of fairness within machine learning, as well as a machine learning perspective on consequentialism. We conclude with a broader discussion of the issues of learning and randomization, which have important implications for the ethics of automated decision making systems.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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