稀疏播种下的竞争传染
Competitive Contagion with Sparse Seeding
摘要:
本文研究了社交网络中的营销和产品扩散策略模型。我们考虑两个公司提供可替代的产品,可以提高他们的市场份额,通过播种在市场上的关键个人。消费者更新他们对这两种产品中每一种的消费水平,作为对前一时期他们邻居的消费的最佳反应。这导致产品消耗的线性更新动态。每个消费者从每个邻居的消费中获得外部性,其中外部性的强度对于消费同一公司的产品更高。我们代表上述设置作为一个双寡头企业之间的博弈,并引入一个新的框架,允许稀疏播种出现作为一个均衡策略。然后,我们研究了网络结构的最佳播种策略和策略可以稀疏化的程度的影响。特别是,我们得出的条件下,近纳什均衡策略可以渐近导致稀疏播种在大人口。使用核心-外围网络的结果进行说明。
英文摘要:
This paper studies a strategic model of marketing and product diffusion in social networks. We consider two firms offering substitutable products which can improve their market share by seeding the key individuals in the market. Consumers update their consumption level for each of the two products as the best response to the consumption of their neighbors in the previous period. This results in linear update dynamics for the product consumption. Each consumer receives externality from the consumption of each neighbor where the strength of the externality is higher for consumption of the products of the same firm. We represent the above setting as a duopoly game between the firms and introduce a novel framework that allows for sparse seeding to emerge as an equilibrium strategy. We then study the effect of the network structure on the optimal seeding strategies and the extent to which the strategies can be sparsified. In particular, we derive conditions under which near Nash equilibrium strategies can asymptotically lead to sparse seeding in large populations. The results are illustrated using a core-periphery network.
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