最佳、真实和私人证券借贷
Optimal, Truthful, and Private Securities Lending
摘要:
我们考虑一个基本的动态分配问题的$\textit{securities lending}$在金融市场的问题,卖空股票的机制。贷方希望向$n$客户分发某种稀缺资源的有限数量的相同副本,每个客户都有贷方不知道的私人需求。贷方希望最大化资源$\mbox{---}$的使用,避免向客户分配比她的真实需求$\mbox{---}$更多的资源,但是贷方被约束为以预先指定的每单位价格出售资源,并且因此不能使用价格来激励真实的报告。我们首先表明,贝叶斯优化算法的一次性问题$\mbox{---}$,最大限度地提高资源的预期使用根据后验预期的需求,报告$\mbox{---}$实际上激励真实的报告作为一个主导战略。由于证券借贷问题中的真实需求通常是客户希望对竞争对手隐藏的敏感信息,因此我们在(联合)差分隐私的附加需求下考虑该问题。我们给出了一个算法,基于简单的动态计算市场均衡,这是同时私人的,近似最优的,近似占主导地位的战略真实。最后,我们利用这个私人算法构建一个近似真实的,最优的机制,广泛的形式多轮拍卖,贷款人没有获得真正的联合分布之间的客户端的请求和需求。
英文摘要:
We consider a fundamental dynamic allocation problem motivated by the problem of $\textit{securities lending}$ in financial markets, the mechanism underlying the short selling of stocks. A lender would like to distribute a finite number of identical copies of some scarce resource to $n$ clients, each of whom has a private demand that is unknown to the lender. The lender would like to maximize the usage of the resource $\mbox{---}$ avoiding allocating more to a client than her true demand $\mbox{---}$ but is constrained to sell the resource at a pre-specified price per unit, and thus cannot use prices to incentivize truthful reporting. We first show that the Bayesian optimal algorithm for the one-shot problem $\mbox{---}$ which maximizes the resource's expected usage according to the posterior expectation of demand, given reports $\mbox{---}$ actually incentivizes truthful reporting as a dominant strategy. Because true demands in the securities lending problem are often sensitive information that the client would like to hide from competitors, we then consider the problem under the additional desideratum of (joint) differential privacy. We give an algorithm, based on simple dynamics for computing market equilibria, that is simultaneously private, approximately optimal, and approximately dominant-strategy truthful. Finally, we leverage this private algorithm to construct an approximately truthful, optimal mechanism for the extensive form multi-round auction where the lender does not have access to the true joint distributions between clients' requests and demands.
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